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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly two hundred years ago, Alexander Hamilton warned: "Thirteen
independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the
same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction
and confusion can proceed." 1 The thirteenth court of appeals, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (or Federal Circuit or
CAFC), was created on October 1, 1982, by the the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982 (FCIA).2 Hamilton's concerns notwithstanding, creating the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not transform the federal appel-
* Associate Professor, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., 1968, M.A., 1970,
University of California at Santa Barbara; M.B.A., 1972; J.D., 1976, University of California at
Berkeley. The author wishes to thank Maurice Rosenberg, Gregory Gelfand, and Rex Zedalis,
who reviewed and made helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), quoted in Schae-
fer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 453 (1983).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 171 note (West Supp. 1983); see generally Petrowitz, Federal Court
Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982-And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 543
(1983).
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late system into a judicial hydra. Instead, the new court should reduce the
contradiction and confusion in patent law that many believed had been gener-
ated by the twelve other courts of appeals.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a new intermediate appel-
late court of restricted subject matter jurisdiction. It was formed by merging
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, two arti-
cle II3 courts located in Washington, D.C. In addition to the jurisdiction of
its predecessor courts, the Federal Circuit has been granted exclusive jurisdic-
tion of appeals from federal district courts throughout the United States in
patent cases. The CAFC is unique among the circuit courts because its juris-
diction is defined by subject matter instead of geography.
The FCIA also established a new article 14 trial court, the Claims Court,
which has assumed substantially all the trial jurisdiction that had been exer-
cised by commissioners in the Court of Claims. Procedures in the Claims
Court have been modernized and, in contrast to the commissioners of the for-
mer Court of Claims, the judges of the Claims Court have the power to render
final judgments. The FCIA also made several reforms in the administration of
federal courts, authorized transfers of actions and appeals between federal
courts to cure jurisdictional defects, provided for a uniform interest rate on
judgments in federal courts, and authorized experimentation with methods for
recording court proceedings by electronic means.
By creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Congress ac-
complished the most significant revision of the federal appellate system since
the Judiciary Act of 19251 expanded the use of writs of certiorari to limit
review by the Supreme Court of decisions of federal courts of appeals and
state supreme courts.6 The caseload of the federal appellate system has risen
dramatically since 1925,7 and it continues to grow exponentially.8 The capac-
3. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 171(a) (West Supp. 1983); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
5. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
6. The Judiciary Act of 1925 is discussed in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSI-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 255-99 (1927). Brief descriptions of the history of the federal judi-
cial system are found in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 32-49 (2d ed. 1973); G. CASPER & R.
POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 11-25 (1976); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 1-8 (4th ed. 1983).
7. In 1972, Judge Friendly noted that filings in the federal courts of appeals had more
than doubled between 1960 and 1968, and he described the courts of appeals as "already in a
state of crisis." H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 31 (1973); see also
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review
and the National Law. 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
8. See 1982 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 1-2 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL
REPORT]. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981) states:
Over the past two decades, the caseload of the federal appellate system has grown
so large that a crisis has arisen. Between 1962 and 1981, appellate court filings in-
creased more than fivefold from 4,832 cases to 26,362. At the same time, the number of
federal circuit judges increased only from 78 to 132. The caseload of each judge more
than tripled during this period. Although the addition of the 35 new appellate judges
authorized by the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-486) has helped the
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ity of the Supreme Court has remained essentially static, however, and during
the past decade the Court has reviewed less than 1% of the cases decided by
the circuit courts of appeals." The rapid caseload growth of the circuit courts
has generated many problems, one of the most serious of which is uncertainty
in a number of areas of national law. 0
With an increasing volume of petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court
is less able to resolve conflicts between the circuits.' When intercircuit con-
flicts develop, forum shopping and repetitious litigation are encouraged.12 Cre-
ating additional appellate circuits (as was done in 198 113) to ease the appellate
workload only exacerbates these conflicts.14 Adding more judges to existing
appellate courts is unsatisfactory because it would produce more intracircuit
conflicts, require time-consuming en banc review of panel decisions, and re-
duce judicial collegiality. 5 A proposition receiving greater attention is the es-
tablishment of national courts of appeals whose jurisdiction is defined by sub-
courts of appeals to keep pace with their work, the trend toward increased appellate
court filings has continued. The addition of numerous district court judges, also created
by the 1978 Omnibus Judgeship Bill, coupled with legislation conferring increased pow-
ers on bankruptcy judges (see Public Law 95-598) and magistrates (see Public Law 96-
82) have generated more lower court decisions requiring appellate review. The net re-
sult is that the federal appellate system faces a crisis that actually is worsening rather
than being solved. This is a crisis that does not only affect judges. As stated in a report
of the Department of Justice:
This is not a crisis for the courts alone. It is a crisis for litigants who seek
justice, for claims of human rights, for the rule of law, and it is therefore a crisis
for the Nation.
(Footnote omitted.)
9. Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A. J. 545, 546-47 (1974). Com-
pare ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2 with id. at 189.
10. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 11, 13; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 93
(1979) (statement of Paul D. Carrington, Dean, Duke University Law School) [hereinafter cited
as FCIA 1979 Hearings]; P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL
208-13 (1976).
I1. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10; Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appel-
late System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
206-07 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Report]; Carrington, supra note 7, at 553; Griswold,
Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1975); Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate
Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 203 (1978); Hufstedler, supra note 9, at 548. Some
observers have disagreed. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 8, 63-92; Hellman, Caseload,
Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28, 35-
36 (1983).
12. FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10; Carrington, supra note 7, at 599-604; Griswold,
supra note 11, at 342; Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228, 237-38
(1975).
13. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94
Stat. 1994.
14. See Hufstedler, supra note 9, at 547.
15. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8; Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 264-66; H.
FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 44-46; Hoffman, The Bureaucratic Spectre: Newest Challenge to the
Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60, 62-63 (1982); Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States Courts of
Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1364-65 (1979).
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ject matter instead of geography. 6 In addition to providing interpretations of
law that are uniform throughout the nation and reducing the incentive for
litigants to engage in forum shopping and repetitious litigation, such appellate
courts could acquire substantial expertise in their subject areas and achieve
great efficiency in deciding cases.1 7 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit is a positive step in this direction; it is the newest national court of appeals
with restricted subject matter jurisdiction.18
This Article deals with the FCIA and its creation of the Federal Circuit.
It begins with a review of two proposals for reform of the federal appellate
court system that were recommended during the 1970's. Next, the special
problems in patent law that gave rise to the need for a national court of patent
appeals are examined. The Article then describes the development of the pro-
posal to create the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by merging the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the Court of Claims. This is fol-
lowed by a detailed analysis of the FCIA, which will highlight some potential
problem areas. The Article concludes with remarks about the prospects for
additional courts of appeals with restricted subject matter jurisdiction.
II. PROPOSALS FOR APPELLATE REFORM DURING THE 1970's
The federal appellate system remains much the same as when it was cre-
ated by the Evarts Act19 in 1891. Before 1891, the United States Supreme
Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over the federal circuit courts and the
state supreme courts."0 With the expansion of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction by the Removal Act of 1875,21 the Supreme Court's docket was
16. Carrington, supra note 7, at 596-612; Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62-85 (1975);
Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 745 (1981); Miller, supra note 12;
Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 473 (1973). Justice O'Connor has endorsed the establishment of specialized courts to deal
with increasing appellate caseloads. Middleton, Specialty Courts, Two More Justices Speak Out,
69 A.B.A. J. 23 (1983).
17. FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10, at 191-96 (statement of Hon. Henry J. Friendly,
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); Currie & Goodman, supra note
16, at 63-68; Jordan, supra note 16, at 747-48.
18. The United States Court of Military Appeals, the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review are other federal appellate
courts having restricted subject matter jurisdiction. Trial courts within the federal system having
restricted subject matter jurisdiction include the Bankruptcy Courts, the Tax Court, the Court of
International Trade, the Claims Court, and the Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act
of 1973. Federal courts with restricted subject matter jurisdiction that formerly existed, other
than the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, include the Emergency
Court of Appeals, the Commerce Court, the Court of Private Land Claims, and the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Citizenship Court. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-61 (1962); Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452-58 (1929); 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN &
J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE %% 0.2-0.3 (2d ed. 1983).
19. Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
20. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §§ 13, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 80, 85; G. CASPER & R. POSNER,
supra note 6, at 11-19; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 12-13.
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
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swamped.22 The Evarts Act provided relief by establishing an intermediate
system of nine regional courts of appeals. This relief was only temporary, how-
ever, as the Supreme Court's docket continued to experience steady growth.23
Further constriction of the flow of cases to the Court's docket came with the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1925,24 which gave the Court substantial
control over its caseload through the writ of certiorari.
By 1959, it was apparent to many that the Supreme Court was becoming
overwhelmed with petitions for certiorari and appeals from lower courts.25 In
1971, Chief Justice Burger appointed a study group, chaired by Professor
Freund of Harvard Law School, to investigate the caseload of the Court and
offer recommendations for reform.28 The Freund Committee decided that the
rising volume of filings was jeopardizing the Supreme Court's ability to per-
form its essential functions. The Committee inferred from the statistics that a
burdensome caseload was forcing the Court to duck issues it would have de-
cided thirty years before, and to give less consideration to the cases that it
decided than it had in the past.27 The Freund Committee concluded:
We are concerned that the Court is now at the saturation point, if not
actually overwhelmed. If trends continue, as there is every reason to believe
they will, and if no relief is provided, the function of the Court must necessa-
rily change. In one way or another, placing even more reliance on an aug-
mented staff, the Court could perhaps manage to administer its docket. But it
will be unable adequately to meet its essential responsibilities.
Remedial measures comparable in scope to those of 1891 and 1925 are
called for once again.2
8
The major remedy proposed by the Freund Committee was the establish-
ment of a National Court of Appeals to screen all petitions for certiorari and
appeals to the Supreme Court. The Committee envisioned that the National
Court would refer approximately 400 of the most significant cases to the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court would then make the final choice of the
cases it would decide. The National Court of Appeals would decide some cases
involving conflicts between the circuit courts and deny review to the remaining
cases.2 9
22. The number of cases handled by the Court increased from 253 in 1850; to 310 in 1860;
to 636 in 1870; to 1,212 in 1880; to 1,816 in 1890. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 12;
F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 60.
23. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 12, 18; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
supra note 6, at 296-97.
24. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
25. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). But see Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 174-78
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 8, 63-92; Hellman,
supra note 11, at 31-33.
26. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 576 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Freund Report].
27. Id. at 581.
28. Id. at 584.
29. Id. at 590-95, 611. The Committee also recommended: the abolition of three-judge
district courts; the elimination of direct appeals to the Supreme Court, id. at 595-607, 611-12, a
1984]
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The reaction to the Committee's recommendation was overwhelmingly
hostile. Among the objections raised were: (1) the court would screen only the
frivolous cases and would leave the more difficult screening to the Supreme
Court;30 (2) the court would add another appellate layer between the trial
courts and the Supreme Court, causing added delay;31 (3) by assuming the
screening function, the court would usurp an important function of the Su-
preme Court and would diminish the Court's prestige;32 (4) the court would
lower the stature of the circuit courts of appeals;33 and (5) the court would
lack prestige sufficient to attract distinguished judges.3 Scorched by persistent
criticism, the Freund Committee's proposal soon was reduced "to a residue of
embers in legal journals."3' 5
On October 13, 1972, Congress established the Commission on Revision
of the Appellate System to recommend changes in the geographic boundaries
of the circuit courts of appeals and in the structure and internal procedures of
the federal appellate system.36 Chaired by Senator Hruska, the Commission
issued two reports. The first report proposed splitting the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits to create two additional circuit courts of appeals.3 7 Congress approved
the splitting of the Fifth Circuit, 8 but has yet to approve the division of the
Ninth Circuit. The second report proposed the establishment of a National
Court of Appeals, which would decide cases referred to it by the Supreme
Court or transferred to it from the circuit courts of appeals, the Court of
Claims, or the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.39
new federal institution to investigate prisoner complaints and mediate prisoner grievances, id. at
586-88, 612; and improvement in the Supreme Court's support and secretarial facilities. Id. at
609-12.
30. Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS LJ.
1313, 1327-29 (1974); Owens, The Hruska Commission's Proposed National Court of Appeals,
23 UCLA L. REV. 580, 585 (1976).
31. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 53-54; Owens, supra note 30, at 586; Note, The Na-
tional Court of Appeals: A Qualified Concurrence, 62 GEo. L.J. 881, 897 (1974).
32. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 54; Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of
Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A. J. 835, 836 (1973);
Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. J. 253, 256 (1973); Note,
supra note 31, at 897-98.
33, H. FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 53.
34. Alsup, supra note 30, at 1337-38; Owens, supra note 30, at 585; Note, supra note 31,
at 899.
35. Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L.
REV. 881, 889-90 (1975).
36. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807, as amended by Act of Sept.
19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153.
37. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223
(1973).
38. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West Supp. 1983); see generally Ainsworth, Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 523 (legislative history).
39. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 199, 236-47. The Commission also recommended
improving the internal operating procedures in the circuit courts and increasing the number of
appellate judges. It proposed that each circuit court of appeals adopt a program to develop, imple-
ment, monitor, and change internal operating procedures. The program would include publication
of the court's internal operating procedures, a notice and comment period preceding changes in
[Vol. 49
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Unlike the Freund Committee, the Hruska Commission did not concen-
trate on the Supreme Court's burden of screening thousands of petitions for
certiorari each year. Instead, the Commission directed its attention to the
Court's ability to monitor the nation's courts effectively and provide a stable,
coherent system of national law.40 It found that the federal judicial system
lacked sufficient appellate capacity to adequately perform these functions, and
identified four major consequences of this failure: conflicts between circuits as
to the statement of the same rule of national law; delay; misuse of valuable
Supreme Court time to resolve minor intercircuit conflicts; and undesirable
uncertainty and repetitious litigation spawned by the possibility of intercircuit
conflicts. 41 The Commission anticipated that the National Court of Appeals
would decide at least 150 cases per year and thus double the national appel-
late capacity.
42
The response to the Hruska Report was only somewhat less negative than
the treatment accorded to the Freund Committee's recommendations.4" Be-
cause the Commission's recommendation would retain the screening function
in the Supreme Court, it avoided the charge that the Court's prestige would be
harmed by the loss of this important function.44 Nevertheless, the Hruska
Commission's suggestions encountered many of the criticisms that had been
directed against the Freund Committee,45 plus some new ones. 6 A bill embod-
ying the Commission's suggestions received little political support and never
got past the hearing stage.47
By the late 1970's, the need for reform of the federal appellate system
these procedures, and an advisory committee to provide input to the court. Id. at 200, 250-53. It
also recommended the adoption of minimum standards for allowance of oral argument in the
circuit courts of appeal, the requiring of a written record showing the reasoning behind the deci-
sion in each case decided by a court of appeals, and selective publication of opinions. Id. at 200-
01, 253-60. Other recommendations of the Hruska Commission included increased use of central
staff attorneys by the circuit courts of appeal, changes in the procedures for en bane hearings, and
the establishment of a standing commission to continue the study of problems in the federal
courts. Id. at 201-03, 260-76.
40. Id. at 209-17.
41. Id. at 217-19, 281-82.
42. Id. at 246-47.
43. See Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the "New" National Court of Appeals: Can the
Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 840-41 & n.14 (1976).
44. Owens, supra note 30, at 599-600.
45. Feinberg, Foreword: A National Court of Appeals?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 611, 615-
16 (1976); Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at 208; Owens, supra note 30, at 602.
46. Critics also charged that: (1) the Supreme Court would have to decide which cases to
refer to the National Court of Appeals, and hence its screening burden would be increased, and
(2) by transferring cases to the National Court of Appeals the circuit courts of appeals could
bypass the Supreme Court, and thus the power and prestige of the Supreme Court would be
diminished. Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal of the Hruska Commission to Establish a Na-
tional Court of Appeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 431, 450-51 (1976); Haworth & Meador, supra note
11, at 208; Owens, supra note 30, at 601-02.
47. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1025 (1978) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at 208; Meador, A Proposal for a
New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 665, 669 (1978).
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had been the subject of intense debate for a number of years.48 For a variety
of reasons, however, Congress did not enact legislation to accomplish the
needed reforms.4" The problems caused by the inadequate national appellate
capacity continued, especially in the areas of tax and patent law. 50 The patent
system had special need of appellate reform, and this need gave impetus to the
passage of the FCIA.
III. THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL COURT OF PATENT APPEALS
The American patent system was designed to stimulate industrial innova-
tion by offering economic incentives "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."51 The system was supposed to reward not only the inventor, who
devoted his time and energy to developing a new product, but also the em-
ployer or investor who committed capital to research, develop, and introduce
new products.52 The reward is the exclusive right to practice the invention for
a seventeen-year period. For inventors and businesses to rely on the patent
system, however, they must have confidence that the rights embodied in a pat-
ent will be enforceable. Unfortunately, intercircuit conflicts in patent law
made the enforceability of patents uncertain and reduced public confidence in
the system.
A. An Overview of the Patent System
The process of obtaining a patent begins with filing an application
describing the invention.53 The application is filed with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office in Washington, D.C. and assigned to a patent examiner, who de-
termines whether the statutory requirements have been met.8 If the examiner
determines that the invention is entitled to patent protection and the applica-
tion is in order, the inventor is notified, and upon receipt of the statutory fee, a
patent is issued to the inventor or his assignee. The patent gives the holder the
48. See generally Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction, and a Pro-
posed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 625-37.
49. Professor Meador has listed these reasons: the presence of competing demands on Con-
gress for legislation in other areas, the lack of an effective political constituency to push for judi-
cial reform, resistance from special interest groups and the bar, and the failure of groups seeking
appellate reform to mount a sustained effort in Congress for a significant period of time. Id. at
637-41.
50. See Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 220, 229-30; P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, &
M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 217-20; G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 113; H.
FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 153-71; Feinberg, supra note 45, at 627.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1980) (statement of Hon. Philip Klutznik, Secretary of Com-
merce) [hereinafter cited as Patent Hearings]. For an economic analysis describing other ways in
which the patent system benefits society by encouraging technological innovation, see Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-122 (1976).
54. Id. §§ 101-104.
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exclusive right to make, use, and sell the invention in the United States for a
seventeen-year period. 55
If the patent examiner rejects the application, he notifies the inventor and
gives his reasons. The inventor (or his patent attorney or agent) may amend
the application and request a reexamination.58 If the application is rejected
again by the examiner, the inventor may appeal to the Board of Appeals of the
Patent and Trademark Office, which has the power to reverse the decision of
the examiner. 7 If the inventor is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board, he
has two avenues of review. The inventor may appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (formerly to the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals) and then seek review by the Supreme Court.5" Alternatively, the inven-
tor may bring a civil action in the District Court for the District of Columbia
against the Commissioner of Patents and seek issuance of the patent. 9 If un-
successful, the inventor may appeal to the Federal Circuit (formerly to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) and then seek final review in
the Supreme Court."'
The patent examiner may decide that the invention described in the pat-
ent application has been preempted by another invention disclosed in a pend-
ing application or a patent that has already been issued. Priority of invention
will then be determined in an interference proceeding between the applicant
and the competing claimant conducted before a Board of Patent Interfer-
ences.8 The Board determines the prior inventor and awards the patent to
him. If a party is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board, he may appeal to
the Federal Circuit (formerly to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals),
and ultimately seek review before the Supreme Court.8 Alternatively, he may
seek issuance of the patent by filing an action in any federal district court
where venue is proper and jurisdiction exists over the other party to the inter-
ference. 63 Appeal may be taken to the Federal Circuit (formerly to the appro-
priate regional court of appeals), from which review by the Supreme Court
55. Id. §§ 131, 151-154 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
56. Id. § 132 (1976).
57. Id. § 134.
58. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-144 (West Supp. 1983); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West
Supp. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
59. 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West Supp. 1983).
60. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976). For a
discussion of the different routes that were available to review decisions of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office before the enactment of the FCIA, see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523-28
(1966).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1976).
62. 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 (West Supp. 1983). The appeal to the Federal Circuit will be dis-
missed within 20 days after notice of appeal is filed if an adverse party elects to proceed under id.
§ 146 (allows remedy by civil action for interference).
63. Standard Oil Co. v. Montecatini Edison S.p.A., 342 F. Supp. 125, 129-33 (D. Del.
1972); 35 U.S.C.A. § 146 (West Supp. 1983). If more than one adverse party is sued under
§ 146 and the adverse parties reside in different states, or if an adverse party sued under § 146
resides in a foreign country, the action may be brought in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Id.
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may be sought."'
It takes the Patent and Trademark Office approximately two years to pro-
cess a patent application, 65 and roughly 60% of the applications result in is-
sued patents.66 After a patent is issued, its owner, in theory, may exclude all
others from making, using, or selling the invention described in the patent.6 7
Alternatively, the owner may assign his rights in the patent or grant licenses
to use the invention in exchange for payment of royalties."
Patent owners frequently have to go to court to enforce their rights, and
their disputes may be litigated in a number of forums. A patent owner may
seek compensatory damages and injunctive relief by bringing a patent in-
fringement action in federal district court.69 The amount of compensatory
damages awarded must be at least the amount of a reasonable royalty for the
use of the invention during the period of infringement, plus interest and
costs.7 0 Recovery is limited to damages for acts of infringement that have oc-
curred within six years of the filing of the action,71 however, and no recovery is
permitted for acts of infringement that have occurred before the infringer re-
ceived actual or constructive notice of the infringement. The patent owner pro-
vides constructive notice by marking the patent's number on products sold to
the public.72 Compensatory damages may be tripled by the court and reasona-
ble attorney fees may be awarded in exceptional cases.73
In general, a patent infringement action may be brought in the district
where the infringer resides or where the infringer has committed acts of in-
fringement and has a regular and established place of business.74 If the in-
fringer is the United States or a government contractor, subcontractor, or per-
son using the invention for the benefit of the United States, the infringement
action can be brought only in the Claims Court (formerly in the Court of
Claims).7 5 Under the venue statute for patent infringement actions, a corpora-
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
65. G. KOENIG, PATENT VALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 3-14 to 3-
15 & n.6 (1980); Schellin, The Innovating Process, 8 APLA Q.J. 155, 168 (1980).
66. G. KOENIG, supra note 65, at 4-4 to 4-5; see Prusak, Does the Patent System Have
Measurable Economic Value?, 10 APLA Q.J. 14, 29 (1982).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. V 1981).
68. An assignment is a transfer of all or part of an owner's rights in a patent; a license is a
grant of permission to a licensee to make, use, or sell the invention described in the patent. An
assignee may sue for infringement of the patent; a licensee may not. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138
U.S. 252, 255 (1891); 2 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 16-3 to 16-13 (2d ed.
1983).
69. 35 U.S.C. 88 281, 283-284 (1976).
70. 35 U.S.C. 8 284 (1976); see also General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 103 S. Ct.
2058 (1983) (discussion of awarding pre-judgment interest in patent infringement actions).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1976).
72. Id. 8 287.
73. Id. § 284.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1976); Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25
STAN. L. REV. 551, 552 (1973).
75. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498(a) (West Supp. 1983). While a patentee may recover compensa-
tion for the use of a patented invention by or for the United States, he may not obtain injunctive
relief. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1118 n.13 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (dictum), cert. denied,
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tion's residence is its state of incorporation. The general venue statute, in con-
trast, provides that a corporation is a resident of any state where it does busi-
ness.7 An alien may be sued for infringement in any district where he may be
served,77 and a patentee may file a complaint with the International Trade
Commission seeking an exclusion order to prevent infringing goods from enter-
ing the United States.78
If a patent owner has licensed or assigned a patent to another party who
is using the invention and a dispute arises, the owner has a choice of remedies.
He may sue for infringement of the patent, for breach of the license agree-
ment, or to recover title.79 In the absence of an assignment or license agree-
ment with an infringer, a patent owner may also be able to plead claims aris-
ing under state *tort law, such as unfair competition, interference with
contract, or interference with prospective business advantage.8" If the patent
owner opts for state law remedies, he may bring his action in any state court
that would be able to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant or, if diversity
jurisdiction exists, in any federal district court where venue is proper.81
Alternatively, the infringer may initiate the litigation, and hence select
the forum, by bringing an action arising under state law82 or the federal anti-
trust laws.83 In addition, the infringer can seek a declaratory judgment that
the patent is invalid or not being infringed." Actions arising under state law
can be brought only in state court, unless diversity jurisdiction exists. Actions
arising under the federal antitrust laws and declaratory judgment actions re-
lating to patent validity or infringement must be brought in federal court;
venue is determined by the federal question venue statute.85
Thus, the forum where a patent dispute is litigated depends on who com-
mences the litigation and how the claims are pleaded. Once the dispute comes
434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
76. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957); Wydick, supra note
74, at 552-53, 558-59.
77. Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
79. Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent
Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633, 646-47 (1971); Wydick, supra note 74, at 567-68.
80. Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970).
81. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976); Chisum, supra note 79; Wydick, supra note 74, at
566-68.
82. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916);
Chisum, supra note 79, at 648-49; Wydick, supra note 74, at 567-68.
83. See Bicks, Threatening to Sue for Patent Infringement: Unfair Competition and An-
titrust Consequences, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 302, 314-19 (1977).
84. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185-86 (1952); Ameri-
can Mach. & Metals v. De Bothezat Impeller Co., 166 F.2d 535, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1948); 3 R.
WHITE, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS 1-38.7 to 1-39 (1983); Chisum, supra note
79, at 649; Gelfand, Expanding The Role of the Patent Office in Determining Patent Validity: A
Proposal, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 75, 90-94 (1979); Wydick, supra note 74, at 566-67.
85. United States Aluminum Corp. v. Kawneer, Inc., 694 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1982);
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976); Wydick, supra note 74, at 566. If the federal question venue statute
applies, a corporate defendant may be sued in any district where it does business. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) (1976).
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to court, the patent owner will probably have to defend the patent's validity.86
Despite the fact that the patent received an examination by the Patent and
Trademark Office before its issuance and despite its statutory presumption of
validity,8 7 there is a good chance that it will be found invalid when it is chal-
lenged in court. Roughly 50-60% of the patents subjected to litigation are held
invalid,88 and determining whether a patent is valid may take years of litiga-
tion and can easily cost $500,000.89 Thus, many view a patent as merely an
invitation to a lawsuit instead of a prize for innovation.90
Many explanations have been offered for the low survival rate of patents
tested in court. Patents subjected to litigation are only a very small portion
(about 0.2%) of the total patents issued, so the sample size may not be suffi-
cient to produce statistically significant results."1 More importantly, litigated
patents probably were challenged because they were weaker than others; thus,
they are not a representative sample of the patents issued by the Patent and
Trademark Office.92 In addition, the scrutiny a patent receives in the adver-
sarial setting of a courtroom is more rigorous than the ex parte examination
conducted at the Patent and Trademark Office. When an accused infringer
challenges the validity of a patent in court, he will have great incentive to
locate prior art that may not have been readily available to the Patent and
Trademark Office.93
B. Patentability: Conflict Over the Synergism Requirement
While some observers contend that the Patent and Trademark Office is
86. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-76 (1969); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976).
87. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976).
88. 127 CONG. REC. H8391 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1981) (statement of Rep. Railsback); G.
KOENIG, supra note 65, at 1-2, 1-4, 3-1 to 3-11; Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity:
An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 758, 760-65 (1974); Horn & Epstein, The
Federal Courts' View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 134, 146-47 (1973);
Kitti, Patent Invalidity Studies: A Survey, 20 IDEA 55 (1979).
89. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Addendum to Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 64 (1979) (statement of Homer 0. Blair, Vice President, Patents and Licensing, Itck
Corporation) [hereinafter cited as Addendum]; 127 CONG. REC. H8391 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1981)
(statement of Rep. Railsback); see also Burton, Reducing the High Costs of Patent Litigation" A
Practical Guide, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 857, 857 (1981); Gelfand, supra note 84, at 95.
90. Guide v. Desperak, 144 F. Supp. 182, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 2 P. ROSENBERG, supra
note 68, at 17-2; Nash, Remarks Before The Industrial Research Institute, 59 J. PAT OFF. SOC'Y
143, 144 (1977).
91. G. KOENIG, supra note 65, at 1-7, 4-42; Diamond, Our Patent System-The Past is
Prologue. 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 437, 442 (1980); Markey, The Status of the U.S. Patent Sys-
tem-Sans Myth, Sans Fiction, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 164, 167 (1977).
92. Baum, supra note 88, at 768; Diamond, supra note 91; Horn & Epstein, supra note
88, at 137; Markey, supra note 91, at 169-70.
93. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1981) (statement of James W. Geriak) [hereinafter cited as Federal Cir-
cuit Hearings]; G. KOENIG, supra note 65, at 1-6; Baum, supra note 84, at 767-68; Woodward, A
Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARv. L. REV.
950, 953, 959 (1942); see Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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too lenient in issuing patents,94 others complain that the federal courts have
been applying unduly strict standards in infringement actions.Y5 Much of the
controversy has centered around the requirement that an invention must be
"nonobvious" to be patentable.9 Since 1952, patent law has mandated the use
of the following test to determine whether an invention satisfies this require-
ment. First, the prior art or state of technology in the field of the invention
must be determined. Second, the differences between the invention and the
prior art must be specified. Third, a decision must be made as to whether the
differences between the invention and prior art would have been obvious to a
hypothetical reasonably skilled practitioner in the field of the invention.97
Legislative history indicates that the obviousness test was added to the
patent statute to dodify case law and provide a uniform standard. 98 Regretta-
bly, a uniform standard of patentability did not emerge before the CAFC was
established. A major reason for this failure has been some unfortunate dicta in
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,99 a Supreme Court decision which suggested that a
94. Eg., Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156
(1950) (Douglas, J., concurring):
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception of patents than
the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The Patent Office, like most admin-
istrative agencies, has looked with favor on the opportunity to which the exercise of
discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has placed a host of gadgets
under the armor of patents--gadgets that obviously have had no place in the constitu-
tional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966); Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 810, 815-17 (1971); Nash, supra note 90, at 147-50.
95. Conner, Some Highly Personal Reflections on Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 77, 84-85
(1977); Edell, The Supreme Court and Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 99, 112-16 (1977); Geriak,
Synergism-How Long Will the Malady Linger On?, 1980 PAT. L. ANN. 51.
96. See text accompanying notes 101-03 infra.
97. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1966); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
98. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1966); Rich, Laying the Ghost of the
"Invention" Requirement, I APLA Q.J. 26 (1972).
99. 425 U.S. 273 (1976). The patent in Sakraida was for a water-flushing system for
removing manure from dairy barns. It called for the abrupt release of water from tanks onto a
sloped floor to clean a barn in a few minutes; doing the cleaning by hand would take several hours.
Id. at 277. The Fifth Circuit had noted that this patent had achieved modest commercial success
and had been licensed to more than 70 dairies across the United States. Ag Pro, Inc. v. Sakraida,
474 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 425 U.S. 273 (1976). The court of appeals had also
observed that persons "skilled in the art reacted to the advancement with surprise." 474 F.2d at
171. Concluding that the patent was valid, the court stated: "Although the plaintiff's flush system
does not embrace a complicated technical improvement, it does achieve a synergistic result
through a novel combination." Id. at 173.
The Supreme Court reversed. 425 U.S. at 273. Comparing the patent to the fifth labor of
Hercules, in which Hercules cleaned the Augean stables by diverting a stream through them, the
Court found the patent to be a combination of old (indeed ancient) elements. It disagreed with the
conclusion of the court of appeals that the combination produced a synergistic result. Although
the Court recognized that the combination produced a .triking result, it emphasized that the pat-
ent merely arranged old elements with each performing its familiar function. "Such combinations
are not patentable under standards appropriate for a combination patent." Id. at 282. The Court
also found that the patent would be obvious to a person skilled in the appropriate art. Id.
A brief account of this case appears in B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN
418-19 (1979). According to Messrs. Woodward and Armstrong, the Sakraida case was dubbed
the "cow shit case" at the Court and was assigned to Justice Brennan (rather than a more junior
justice) by Chief Justice Burger because of friction between the two Justices. Feeling insulted by
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combination invention must possess synergism to be patentable. A combination
invention brings together old elements into a new invention. To possess syner-
gism, the combination must produce an effect that is greater than the sum of
the effects of the old elements taken separately.100 A number of commentators
have noted that all inventions consist of combinations of old elements, 101 and
that the effect of a combination of old elements can never exceed the sum of
the effects of the old elements taken separately.' 02 Therefore, under the syner-
gism analysis, practically every patent will be declared invalid.10 3
Not suprisingly, Sakraida'" and the synergism requirement' have been
harshly criticized. Despite the language in Sakraida, the Patent and Trade-
mark Office,108 the Federal Circuit, and several regional circuit courts of ap-
peals have stated that synergism is not a requirement for patentability. 07
the assignment, Justice Brennan reportedly wrote the opinion without the assistance of his clerks.
100. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
101. Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(dictum); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 904 n.46 (10th Cir.
1979) (Miller, J.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 912
n.22 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, J.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979); Reeves Instrument Corp. v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 270-71 & n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951
(1971); FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10, at 114 (statement of Hon. Howard T. Markey,
Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); G. KOENIG, supra note 65, at 2-87; Conner,
supra 95, at 84; Edell, supra note 95, at 114; Rich, Escaping The Tyranny of Words-Is Evolu-
tion in Legal Thinking Impossible?. 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 271, 296 (1978).
102. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1055 (1981); Republic Indus. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1979); Bren-
nan v. Mr. Hanger, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1215, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Conner, J.); Conner, supra
note 95, at 85 ("[T]he overall performance of the combination is always precisely equal to the
sum of the functions of its components. In the real world, two plus two never equals five."); Mar-
key, The Synergism Virus: Cause and Cure, Address Before the Los Angeles Patent Law Associa-
tion (Sept. 16, 1980), reprinted in PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 496, at D-I
(Sept. 18, 1980).
103. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1055 (1981); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 549 F.2d 833, 839 (7th Cir.) (Pell J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); Conner, supra note 95, at 85; Geriak, Syner-
gism-The Artificial Barrier to Patentability, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION
IN PATENTABILITY 7:301, 7:309 (1980); Markey, supra note 102, at D-l; Comment, Sakraida V.
Ag Pro, Inc.: Combination Patents Now Require Synergistic Effects, 15 Hous. L. REv. 157, 169
(1977); Comment, Patentability of Mechanical Combinations: A Definition of Synergism, 57
TEX. L. REv. 1043, 1054 (1979).
104. D. DUNNER, J. GAMBRELL, M. ADELMAN & C. LiPsEY, PATENT LAW PERSPEcrIVES 2-
421 to 2-431 (2d ed. 1984); Kitch, supra note 51, at 284; Mintz, The Standard of Patentability In
the United States-Another Point of View, 1977 DEr. C.L. REV. 755.
105. Synergism has been called "the bugbear of the patent system," Colaianni, 35 U.S.C.
§ 103: A Quest for Objectivity, 1981 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 216; a "vicious virus [that] if
allowed to grow can destroy the patent system," Markey, supra note 102, at D-l; a "malady,"
Geriak, supra note 95; an "artificial barrier to patentability," Geriak, supra note 103; and "an
anomalous encrustation on 35* U.S.C. § 103 and the standard of obviousness it contains," Ham-
merquist v. Clarke's Sheet Metal, 658 F.2d 1319, 1323 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd on rehearing,
Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982).
106. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE 129 (4th ed. 1979) (rev. 9 Sept. 1982).
107. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (dictum);
Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroequip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (dictum); Chore-Time
Equip. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781 (Ped. Cir. 1983) (dictum); Rengo Co. v. Molins
Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 543-47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); Plastic Container
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Other circuits have required synergism,"'8 and one circuit court has compro-
mised the issue by requiring that an invention produce unusual or surprising
results to be patentable. 109
The disagreement over synergism and other intercircuit conflicts n ° cre-
ated a very difficult situation for patent owners. An appeal from a patent in-
fringement or other action in a federal district court was heard by the court of
appeals for the circuit embracing the district,""' and that court of appeals
would apply its own precedent. Thus, a patent's validity depended on where it
was litigated.112 Because the parties to a patent dispute generally had a wide
choice of forums in which to litigate,' 3 forum shopping often resulted." 4 Pat-
ent owners rushed to bring infringement actions in circuits thought to be
favorable to patents, while potential infringers hurried to file declaratory judg-
ment actions in circuits with reputations for invalidating patents."15
Patent owners were handicapped in this contest, not only by the restric-
Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1979) (Miller, J.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1018 (1980); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980); Republic Indus. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963,
967-72 (7th Cir. 1979).
108. See Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, 708 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir.
1983) (finding of synergism negated charge of obviousness); Smith v. Acme Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d
1086, 1093-95 (6th Cir. 1980); Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir.
1979) (a combination invention must produce a new effect, not merely the sum of the effects of its
elements with each performing its expected function); ITT Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d
453, 456-57 (1st Cir.) (affirming finding that the invention was synergistic and hence patentable),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976).
109. Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Annot.,
60 A.L.R. FED. 562 (1982) (conflicting cases).
110. For lists of intercircuit conflicts in patent law that are ready for resolution by the
Federal Circuit, see Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 APLA Q.J. 227, 232-34 (1982); Pretty, A
Forecast of CAFC Holdings on Issues Unsettled in the Circuits Based on CCPA Precedents, 10
APLA Q.J. 270 (1982).
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976) (amended 1982).
112. Analyses of holdings of patent validity by each of the circuit courts of appeals can be
found in G. KOENIG, supra note 65, at 4-25 to 4-33 (from 1953-1977); Baum, supra note 88, at
762 (from 1961-1973); Horn & Epstein, supra note 88, at 146 (from 1961-1970); Kitti, supra
note 88, at 62 (from 1953-1962). These studies indicate that patentees have had substantially
greater success in the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits than in the Second, Third, and Eighth
Circuits.
113. See text accompanying notes 74-85 supra. Patent disputes that get to court typically
involve parties who conduct business in many regions of the country, thus opening a wide choice of
forums. See Gelfand, supra note 84, at 93.
114. Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 738 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
860 (1977); Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 105 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 199 F.2d 732
(2d Cir. 1952); Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 220, 369-71; 3 R. WHITE, supra note 84, at 4-5
("IT]he reports in patent cases are unparalleled for the frequency and vigor of forum contests.").
But see FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10, at 701-06 (Position Paper of the Bar Association of
the Seventh Federal Circuit) (discounted significance of forum shopping in patent litigation).
115. "[M]ad and undignified races. . . sometimes occur between a patentee who wishes to
sue for infringement in one circuit believed to be benign towards patents, and a user who wants to
obtain a declaration of invalidity or non-infringement in one believed to be hostile to them." H.
FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 155; see O'Rourke, Do Unto Others Before They Do Unto You Or:
Current Trends in Declaratory Judgments, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 541, 543 (1975) (patentees and
potential infringers "stampede to the courthouse" to obtain the most favorable forum).
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tive venue provisions for patent infringement actions,110 but by the rules of
collateral estoppel. A patent owner who prevailed in an action against an in-
fringer would not be able to collaterally estop infringers from challenging his
patent's validity. 1 7 But if he lost an action on the grounds that his patent was
invalid, his patent was broken, and the patent owner generally was barred
from relitigating the patent's validity against other infringers.",8 Therefore, it
was difficult for patent owners and licensees to determine the value of their
patents.119 This uncertainty undermined the patent system and reduced indus-
try's incentive to invest in research and development.120
C. Perceived Shortcomings of a National Court of Patent Appeals
The Hruska Commission recognized the special problems created by the
lack of uniformity in patent law when it studied a proposal to establish a spe-
cialized court of patent appeals.121 The Commission found a number of objec-
116. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957). Com-
pare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b), 1498(a) (1976) (venue in patent and copyright cases) with Id.
§ 1391 (general venue provision).
117. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329(1971); Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710-11 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Carter-
Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 873 (2d Cir. 1971); Dicar, Inc.
v. L. E. Sauer Mach. Co., 530 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (D.N.J. 1982); Leesona Corp. v. Varta Bat-
teries, 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Nevertheless, a judicial determination may
strengthen the statutory presumption of validity, and a court in a subsequent proceeding may
require persuasive new evidence that was not available to the prior court to rebut the strengthened
presumption. Illinois Tool Works v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977); Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp. 534 F. Supp. 418, 432 (D.
Mass. 1982); Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1318 & n.52 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). A jury may consider evidence of prior cases upholding the patent's validity. Farmhand,
Inc. v. Anel Eng'g Indus., 693 F.2d 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 1982).
118. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971);
Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agricultural Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376-79 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Bourns, Inc. v.
United States, 537 F.2d 486, 489-90 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Convergence Corp. v. Videomedia, 539 F.
Supp. 760, 762-63 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.
Hawaii 1979), afid, 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981). To be collaterally estopped from relitigating a
patent's validity, the patentee must have been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate validity
in the first action. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333-34
(1971); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
119. Addendum, supra note 89, at 63 (statement of Homer 0. Blair, Vice President, Pat-
ents and Licensing, Itek Corp.) ("[A] patent may be held valid or invalid, or an invention may or
may not be patentable, depending on what circuit a patent infringement trial is held in.").
120. Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 189-206 (statement of Pauline Newman,
Director of Patents and Licensing, FMC Corp.-Chemical Group) ("Who would build a house on
land to which the title is in doubt, on land to which the title may vary with the court; and to
complete the analogy, on land'to which the title won't be clarified until after you have moved into
the house?"); Patent Hearings, supra note 52, at 68 (statement of Pindaros Roy Vagelos, M.D.,
President of Merck, Sharp & Dohme Research Laboratories) ("A fundamental prerequisite to
restoring the necessary incentives to research and development is to restore the reliability of the
patent."); Addendum, supra note 89, at 54-70 (statements of Donald R. Dunner, President,
American Patent Law Association; Homer 0. Blair, Vice President, Patents and Licensing, Itek
Corp.; and Harry F. Manbeck, General Patent Counsel, General Electric Co.); Milnamow, The
Patent System. . . An Underused Weapon in the Economic Arsenal, 10 APLA Q.J. 71 (1982).
121. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 234-36. The creation of a national court of patent
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tions to the concept of specialized courts and rejected this solution. One objec-
tion was that judges in specialized courts might develop "tunnel vision" and
lose the generalist perspective necessary to integrate their specialty into the
legal mainstream.1 2 2 The Commission also was concerned that, because of
their greater expertise, judges on specialized courts might not exercise appro-
priate judicial restraint and might substitute their judgment for that of trial
judges. Also, giving a specialized court a monopoly over a particular category
of cases could reduce its incentive to express its reasoning clearly and thus
could adversely affect the quality of the judicial process. The Hruska Commis-
sion believed that a benefit was gained from the expression of a regional influ-
ence by the circuit courts of appeals and that this benefit would be lost if cases
were centralized in specialized courts.'23 In addition, removing cases from the
circuit courts of appeals would, to some extent, limit the diet of the judges on
these courts and constrict their generalist perspective. Finally, the Commission
noted concerns, on the one hand, that specialized courts might not have pres-
tige sufficient to attract qualified judges to serve on them1 24 and, on the other
hand, that interest groups might be able to capture positions on specialized
courts.1 215
The Hruska Commission concluded that the creation of a specialized
court for patent appeals had many disadvantages and that its creation would
not remedy what it believed was the central problem in the federal court sys-
tem-inadequate appellate capacity. Instead of a specialized court, the Com-
mission recommended a National Court of Appeals, which it hoped would be
capable of eliminating intercircuit conflicts, not only in patent law, but in
other areas of federal law. 126 This recommendation of the Commission was
never adopted; a more politically acceptable approach was needed if reform
was to occur.
appeals had been advocated for many years. Since 1887, over 40 bills have been introduced in
Congress to establish a national court of appeals. See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, &
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., SINGLE COURT
OF PATENT APPEALS-A LEGiSLATivE HISTORY 1-2 (Comm. Print 1959) (M. Conway).
122. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 234-35; see Freund Report, supra note 26, at 585-
86; P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 168-69; Currie & Good-
man, supra note 16, at 69; Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at 227-28; Jordan, supra note 16,
at 748; Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation
and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 787 (1983); Rifkind, A
Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425
(1951).
123. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 235. But cf P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 154-55 (regional influence may be harmful).
124. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 235. Many judges might find serving on a special-
ized court monotonous. Posner, supra note 122, at 779-80.
125. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 235; see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. Ro-
SENBERG, supra note 10, at 168; Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence and Substan-
tive Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 823 (1977);
Currie & Goodman, supra note 16, at 70-71; Jordan, supra note 16, at 748; Posner, supra note
122, at 783-84. Baum has concluded that since 1956 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
has been significantly influenced by the patent bar to adopt relatively lenient patent validity stan-
dards. Baum, supra, at 839-40, 845-46.
126. See text accompanying notes 36-47 supra.
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IV. THE POLITICAL COMPROMISE
In 1977, the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice
(OIAJ) at the Department of Justice, under the leadership of Assistant Attor-
ney General Meador, began to study a proposal for appellate reform1 27 which
evolved into the FCIA. The strategy used by the OIAJ to devise a politically
acceptable proposal was to concentrate on three areas-patent, tax, and envi-
ronmental law-where the need for reform was thought to be greatest. In for-
mulating its proposal, the OIAJ examined criticisms that had been directed
against the recommendations of the Freund Committee and the Hruska Com-
mission and developed a list of objectives including: not creating a fourth tier
in the federal judicial system; staffing new appellate tribunals with permanent
article III judges with significant responsibilities; maintaining the prestige of
other courts; avoiding undue specialization of judges; allowing flexibility in the
federal court system; preserving the availability of Supreme Court review; not
unduly increasing the number of judges or courts; and minimizing jurisdic-
tional disputes. 28
The original OIAJ proposal called for the establishment of a Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit consisting of the twelve judges from the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims, plus three additional
judges. The new court was to be given all the jurisdiction that had been exer-
cised by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims,
and exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from all federal district courts in patent,
environmental, and civil tax cases.129 As the proposal moved through the legis-
lative process, the size of the court was reduced to twelve judges, and environ-
mental and civil tax appeals were removed from the courts jurisdiction.1 0
The legislation that emerged from Congress as the FCIA was designed to
achieve the OIAJ objectives. Thus, the CAFC has not added a fourth tier to
the federal judicial system. Instead, it is on line with the circuit courts of
appeals and handles appeals only in specified subject areas.13' The new court
was staffed initially by the twelve article III judges of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims, with replacements to be ap-
pointed by the President with Senate confirmation. 32 Because the jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit is greater than the total jurisdiction exercised by its
127. Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Proposal to
Improve the Federal Appellate System, reprinted in PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
No. 389, at D-1 (Aug. 3, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OIAJ Proposal].
128. Addendum, supra note 89, at 32 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney
General, OIAJ); OIAJ Proposal, supra note 127, at D-3; Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at
209-10.
129. OIAJ Proposal, supra note 127, at D-6; Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at 224-
25; Meador, supra note 47, at 671.
130. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 1295 (West Supp. 1983).
131. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 2-3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 12-13.
132. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 165, 96 Stat. 25, 50;
28 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (West Supp. 1983).
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predecessor courts, its judges continue to have significant responsibilities.1 33
The CAFC has not appreciably lowered the prestige of the regional court
of appeals, since it is on line with them and has absorbed only a small part of
their jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, the FCIA benefited from the lack of regret
that most federal appeals judges felt in losing jurisdiction over patent cases.134
The CAFC's jurisdiction is limited by subject matter and hence, to some ex-
tent, is a specialized appellate court and subject to the concerns over speciali-
zation of courts that had been voiced by the Hruska Commission and
others. 3 Nevertheless, a fairly wide variety of cases comes within its jurisdic-
tion,136 and supporters of the FCIA argued that undue specialization was
avoided because the new court is less specialized than its predecessors." 7
The FCIA allows additional flexibility in the federal judicial system, be-
cause the Federal Circuit provides a forum to which Congress can assign other
categories of cases 38 instead of creating new temporary appellate courts, such
as the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals'3 9 and the Foreign Intel-
legence Surveillance Court of Review.'4 0 Supreme Court review of the new
court's decisions is available through the means provided for review of the
regional courts of appeals.141 Because the CAFC was created by merging the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the Court of Claims, it has not
unduly increased tlie number of judges or courts in the federal system. The
FCIA attempted to minimize jurisdictional disputes by using a "bright line"
approach. The new court's appellate jurisdiction is defined in terms of whether
the trial court's jurisdiction was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C.
133. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 17.
134. See Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 46 ("I have often thought, except for
the pay, the most unattractive thing about being a Federal judge was sentencing . . . and patent
cases. So I feel you are doing the other circuits nothing but a favor in [removing patent cases from
the jurisdiction of the regional courts of appeals], and I'm sure the bulk of them will feel that
way, too.") (statement of Rep. Sawyer, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary). One distinguished judge on the Seventh Circuit
considered titling an article on the proposal to transfer appeals in patent cases from the regional
courts of appeals to the Federal Circuit: "The Lion Roars in Gratitude as Androcles Pulls the
Troublesome Thorn." Pell, Patent Law Cases-A Retrospectivi View from a Lame Swan Appel-
late Judge, 9 APLA Q.J. 105, 109 (1981).
135. See notes 122-25 and accompanying text supra.
136. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West Supp. 1983); S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 6, re-
printed in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 16; Addendum, supra note 89, at 37 (state-
ment of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, OIAJ).
137. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 19; Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 9
(statement of Hon. Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); id.
at 38 (statement of Hon. Daniel M. Friedman, Chief Judge, Court of Claims); 127 CONG. REc.
S14694 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Dole).
138. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 14; see also FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10, at 57 (statement of Erwin N. Gris-
wold, former Solicitor General and former Dean, Harvard Law School); Haworth & Meador,
supra note 11, at 229.
139. See Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211, 85
Stat. 743, 748-50 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note at 589-90 (1976).
140. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (Supp. V 1981).
141. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (West Supp. 1983).
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§ 1338142 and involved a patent claim.143
In addition to satisfying the OIAJ's objectives, the FCIA had other ad-
vantages. Foremost is that it has enhanced uniformity in patent law by provid-
ing a central forum for deciding patent appeals and thus has decreased the
incentive for litigants to engage in forum shopping. 44 The greater uniformity
in patent law should reduce the repetitious litigation encouraged by the exis-
tence of intercircuit conflicts and the consequent uncertainty in patent law. 45
Further, the increased predictability in patent law should facilitate business
planning and stimulate greater use of the patent system.146
The FCIA will also provide some relief to the crowded dockets of the
regional courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Although patent cases rep-
resented only about 1% of the total caseload of the courts of appeals, 47 they
tended to be complex and consequently consumed more than their share of
court time. 48 As the judges on the new court develop greater expertise, they
will probably take less time to decide patent cases,"91 and the quality of appel-
late decisions should improve.' 50
Consolidating the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the Court
of Claims also afforded Congress the opportunity to overhaul procedures in the
trial division of the Court of Claims. Formerly, the Court of Claims consisted
of seven article III judges, who functioned primarily as an appellate court, 1'5
and sixteen commissioners, who served as trial judges in cases filed with the
Court of Claims.15' The commissioners had authority to conduct trials, make
reports of facts, and recommend conclusions of law.'53 Only the article III
142. (1976).
143. See Patent Hearings, supra note 52, at 392 (statement of Frank P. Cihlar, Department
of Justice); Ciblar & Goldstein, A Dialogue About the Potential Issues in the Patent Jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 APLA Q.J. 284 (1982); Haworth & Meador,
supra note 11, at 230; Meador, supra note 47, at 673-74.
144. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 3-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONc. & AD.
NEws at 13-16; Addendum, supra note 89, at 36-37 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant
Attorney General, OIAJ).
145. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 15; Federal Circuit Heaings, supra note 93, at 191, 196-97 (statement of Pauline New-
man, Director of Patents and Licensing, FMC Corp.).
146. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 16; Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at 234.
147. Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 102, 107 (statement of Albert E. Jenner,
Jr., Chairman, Committee to Preserve the Patent Jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts of Appeals).
148. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 22-23, 27; Addendum, supra note 89, at 37
(statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, OIAJ).
149. Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 42-43 (statement of Hon. Howard T.
Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) ("[I]f I am doing brain surgery
every day, day in and day out, chances are very good that I will do your brain surgery much
quicker, or a number of them, than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of years.").
150. See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 497 F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d
Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974); Haworth & Meador, supra note II, at
234.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1976) (repealed 1982); Ct. Cl. R. 8 (1976).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 792(a) (Supp. V 1981) (repealed 1982); Ct. Cl. R. 12 (1976).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2503 (1976) (repealed 1982); Ct. Cl. R. 13, 134 (1976).
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judges had the authority to render judgments, however, so all decisions of the
trial division had to be reviewed by the article III judges.5 The filing of a
dispositive motion (such as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judg-
ment) 15 could delay resolution of the action by suspending referral to the trial
judge so that the article III judges could decide the motion. 56 The article III
judges and the trial judges on the Court of Claims, as well as the attorneys
who practiced before them, were frustrated with the cumbersome procedures
and supported the FCIA restructuring of their court. 57
Finally, the creation of the Federal Circuit was convenient from an ad-
ministrative standpoint. Because the CAFC was formed by merging two ex-
isting courts, the cost of implementing the FCIA was modest. 58 The workload
of the new court consists of the combined caseloads of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims, plus appeals from the federal
district courts in patent cases and cases filed in the federal district courts
under the Tucker Act. 159 Although the workload per judge is heavier since the
merger, it is still lighter than in the regional courts of appeals. 160
The FCIA secured approval from Congress, where the proposals of the
Freund Committee and the Hruska Commission failed, because it was tailored
to overcome the criticisms that these earlier recommendations had received.
Opposition to the FCIA was minimized by its concentration on patent law,
where the need for appellate reform was widely recognized. The FCIA also
benefited from the support of the patent bar,16 ' the judges on the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims, and the Judicial Con-
ference.'"' Finally, the fact that the FCIA could be implemented without dis-
rupting the operation of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
154. Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 21 (statement of Hon. Daniel M. Fried-
man, Chief Judge, Court of Claims); see Ct. CI. R. 147 (1976).
155. Ct. Cl. R. 52 (1976).
156. Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 22, 38 (statement of Hon. Daniel M.
Friedman, Chief Judge, Court of Claims); see Ct. Cl. R. 14(b)(2) (1976); Evans, Current Proce-
dures in the Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 422, 441-42 (1966).
157. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 18; Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 23, 38 (statement of Hon. Daniel M.
Friedman, Chief Judge, Court of Claims); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981-S.21 and
State Justice Institute Act of 1981-S.537 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 234-43 (1981) (statement of Clarence T.
Kipps and Steven C. Lambert, Court of Claims Commitee of the Bar Association of the District
of Columbia) [hereinafter cited as FCIA 1981 Hearings].
158. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 32-33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 42-43.
159. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.) (jurisdiction of suits against the United States).
160. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 6-7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 16-17; Addendum, supra note 89, at 38-39 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant
Attorney General, QIAJ).
161. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 15; H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 21-22 and references cited therein. For a listing
of organizations and persons supporting the FCIA, see 127 CONG. REC. H8391-92 (daily ed. Nov.
17, 1981) (statement of Rep. Railsback).
162. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 21-22.
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Court of Claims surely facilitated its passage by Congress.
V. THE FCIA-A DESCRIPTION
A. Composition of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The CAFC is similar in many ways to its predecessor courts. The original
judges (including senior judges) on the new court were drawn from the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims.16 3 Successors are to
be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 1 '
The Federal Circuit occupies quarters which previously housed the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims.1 65 To mollify critics
who charged that it would be a Washington court, 66 the Federal Circuit is
authorized to hold regular and special sessions anywhere in the United
States.167 The court is also authorized to employ technical assistants to aid its
judges in patent areas.168
Like other courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit may use panels of judges
to hear and decide cases. To avoid undue specialization and protect against
capture by special interest groups, 69 the CAFC must rotate its judges among
panels so that all judges will hear a cross section of cases. 70 To enhance sta-
bility on legal issues where intercircuit conflicts exist,' 7' the Federal Circuit is
authorized to sit in panels of more than three judges without having a full en
banc hearing.' 7 2 The court has adopted rules,' 73 which supplement the Federal
163. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 165, 96 Stat. 25, 50.
164. 28 U.S.C.A. § 44 (West Supp. 1983). The FCIA contains a suggestion from Congress
that the President "select from a broad range of individuals" in nominating persons to serve on the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Claims Court, Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 165, 96 Stat. 25, 51, so that undue specialization will be avoided.
H.R. RaP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 50. For descriptions of the confirmation hearings for one
nominee to the CAFC, see PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 650, at 516-17 (Oct.
13, 1983); id. No. 649, at 497-98 (Oct. 6, 1983). The nominee died before he was confirmed. Id.
No. 658, at 142 (Dec. 8, 1983).
165. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 23; Addendum, supra note 89, at 38 (statement
of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, OIAJ).
166. See Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 61 (statement of Julius Jancin, Jr.,
President-Elect, American Patent Law Association).
167. 28 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West Supp. 1983). During April, 1983, the court heard appeals in
Chicago and San Francisco. Chief Judge Markey Reviews First Year of Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 15 THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1983, at 1, 7.
168. 28 U.S.C.A. § 715 (West Supp. 1983). Although technical assistants had been utilized
by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals for many years, H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8,
at 37, their employment had not been authorized by Congress. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at
17, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 27.
169. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 31.
170. 28 U.S.C.A. § 46 (West Supp. 1983). This provision is designed to prevent judges
with patent law expertise from deciding a disproportionate number of patent cases. H.R. REP.
No. 312, supra note 8, at 31.
171. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 30-31.
172. 28 U.S.C.A. § 46 (West Supp. 1983). The regional courts of appeals are restricted to
hearing cases either in three-judge panels or en bane. Id. A court of appeals with more than 15
active judges may perform its en banc function with less than all of its judges if its rules so
provide. 28 U.S.C. § 41 note (Supp. V 1981). The Ninth Circuit, the only court of appeals with
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Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the first case it heard, the court adopted the
precedents of its predecessor courts as a foundation for its future decisions. 1 74
B. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
1. In General
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is defined
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295.175 The court has been given exclusive jurisdicion of
appeals that previously went to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 7 6
more than 15 active judges, has authorized limited en bane review by 11 judges. 9TH CIR. R. 25.
173. See generally Lieberstein, Taking and Perfecting an Appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 APLA Q.J. 324 (1982).
174. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982); see also Bar
Zel Expediters v. United States, 698 F.2d 1210 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (decisions of the Court of
Customs Appeals are binding precedent in the Federal Circuit).
175. (West Supp. 1983).
176. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1292(d), 1295(a)(4)-(8) (West Supp. 1983) with 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1545 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (repealed 1982). The CAFC thus has jurisdiction of ap-
peals from the Patent and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications, patent interfer-
ences, applications for registration of marks, and other proceedings provided for in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071 (1982). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1983). For a description of the
jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office formerly exercised by the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, see Gholz, Patent and Trademark Jurisdiction of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 416 (1972). To centralize patent appeals,
the Federal Circuit has been granted exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from civil actions brought
in federal district courts pursuant to 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 145, 146 (West Supp. 1983) to review deci-
sions of the Board of Appeals and the Board of Patent Interferences of the Patent and Trademark
Office. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1983). Previously, these appeals had gone to
the regional courts of appeals. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 145, 146 (1976) (amended 1982).
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from the Court of International
Trade (formerly the Customs Court). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(5) (West Supp. 1983). The Court
of Customs Appeals, the predecessor to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, was created in
1909 to increase uniformity and reduce delay in the administration of the tariff laws. The name of
the court was changed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1929 when appeals from
the Patent Office (now the Patent and Trademark Office) were added to the court's jurisdiction.
Descriptions of the formation of the Court of Customs Appeals can be found in F. FRANKFURTER
& J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 148-52; G. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 6-19 (1980); Graham, The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, Its History, Functions and Jurisdiction, 1 FED. B. Ass'N J., Oct. 1932, at 33-37. For a
discussion of the Court of International Trade, see Cohen, The New United States Court of Inter-
national Trade, 20 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 277 (1981).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review final deter-
minations of the International Trade Commission (ITC) (formerly the Tariff Commission) relat-
ing to unfair import trade practices. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(6) (West Supp. 1983). Pursuant to
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), the ITC may issue orders to exclude articles from entering the United
States if they infringe on a United States patent or otherwise involve unfair practices. See gener-
ally Kaye & Plaia, Revitalization of Unfair Trade Causes in the Importation of Goods: An Anal-
ysis of Amendments to Section 337 (pt. I), 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 208 (1975); Kaye, Unfair
Competition Appeals Under the New Trade Act, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 659 (1975).
Like its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the CAFC has exclusive
jurisdiction over findings by the Secretary of Commerce made under the Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Materials Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-651, 80 Stat. 897 (Educational Materials
Act). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(7) (West Supp. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1544 (1976) (repealed
1982). A scientific instrument or apparatus may be imported duty-free under the Educational
Materials Act by a nonprofit institution for educational or scientific purposes if no equivalent
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In addition, it has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals that previously were de-
cided by the article III judges on the Court of Claims. These include appeals
from final decisions of the Claims Court, which has virtually the same juris-
diction that was exercised by the trial division of the Court of Claims,17 and
appeals from final decisions of agency boards of contract appeals under the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978.1
Besides the jurisdiction of its predecessor courts, the CAFC has been
given exclusive appellate jurisdiction in four areas. First, it has exclusive juris-
diction of appeals (except in discrimination cases) 179 from most final orders
and decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board, a tribunal created under
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978180 to hear disputes between federal
agencies and their employees. 181 Formerly, jurisdiction of these appeals was
instrument is manufactured in the United States. Applications under the Educational Materials
Act are decided by the Secretary of Commerce, subject to review on questions of law only by the
Federal Circuit. See University of N.C. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 701 F.2d 942 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals under 7 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982)
of the Plant Variety Protection Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(8) (West Supp. 1983). Previously
such appeals were shared by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the regional courts of
appeals. 7 U.S.C. § 2461 (1976) (amended 1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1545, 2353 (1976) (repealed
1982).
Finally, provisions are made in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(d) (Vest Supp. 1983) for appeals of
interlocutory orders certifying questions of law from the Court of International Trade for determi-
nation by the CAFC, and for review of interlocutory orders authorizing hearings by judges of the
Court of International Trade in foreign countries.
177. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(3) (Vest Supp. 1983); H.R. Rap. No. 312, supra note 8, at
42.
178. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(10), (b), (c) (West Supp. 1983); 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613
(Supp. V 1981). Under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, a government contractor may seek
review of a contracting officer's decision by appealing to the CAFC (formerly to the Court of
Claims) or by filing suit on his claim directly in the Claims Court (formerly the trial division of
the Court of Claims). See Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 726, 727 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 352, 353 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Paragon Energy
Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 970 (Ct. Cl. 1981); 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 607(g), 609(a) (West
Supp. 1983).
Estimates based on 1981 figures for appellate caseloads indicated that approximately 160
cases of the new court's caseload would come from the former jurisdiction of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, around 500 cases would come from the former jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims, and roughly 400 cases would come from cases formerly heard by the regional courts of
appeals. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 24; S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 7, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 17.
179. Granado v. Department of Justice, 721 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Williams v.
Department of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (1982).
180. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (1982); see generally Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672
F.2d 150, 153-56 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Note, Federal Employment-The Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978-Removing Incompetents and Protecting "Whistle Blowers," 26 WAYNE L. REV. 97
(1979).
181. Meehan v. United States Postal Serv., 718 F.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Rosano v. Department of the Navy, 699 F.2d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1295(a)(9) (West Supp. 1983). But see Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 718 F.2d
391 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) precluded judicial review); Lancellotti v. Office of Per-
sonnel Management, 704 F.2d 91, 98 n.12 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting loophole in jurisdictional grant);
5 U.S.C. § 1207(c) (1982) (appeals of certain disciplinary actions against government employees
go to the regional courts of appeals).
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
shared by the regional courts of appeals and the Court of Claims if review was
sought by an aggrieved employee; 182 if review was sought by the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management, the agency charged with administering
the civil service, jurisdiction was exercised exclusively by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.183 Second, the Federal Circuit has exclusive ju-
risdiction of appeals from all federal district courts in civil actions against the
United States for $10,000 or less that are not founded upon tort or tax
claims.184 The federal district courts continue to have concurrent jurisdiction
over these actions with the Claims Court (formerly the trial division of the
Court of Claims). These relatively minor actions can be tried locally in the
district courts,185 but appeals are now centralized. Third, the new court has
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from all federal district courts in patent cases
where the trial court's jurisdiction "was based, in whole or in part," on 28
U.S.C. § 1338.188 Finally, the Federal Circuit has been given jurisdiction over
appeals of various interlocutory orders.187
182. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (amended 1982).
183. Id. § 7703(d).
184. Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1295(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
185. Schwartz, Two New Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 1091, 1092 (1982); see 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1346(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
186. (1976). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
187. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(c), (d) (West Supp. 1983). This jurisdiction extends to orders by
federal district courts that involve injunctive relief if the appeal from the final decision would go
to the Federal Circuit, judgments in patent infringement cases that are final except for an ac-
counting, and orders certifying questions of law from the Claims Court and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade to the CAFC. See United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 883-85 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Holmes v. Bendix Corp., 713 F.2d 792, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Aleut Tribe v. United States, 702
F.2d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Veach v. Vinyl Improvement Prods. Co., 700 F.2d 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
In appropriate cases, the Federal Circuit may hear appeals of interlocutory orders under the
collateral order doctrine, and it may issue writs of mandamus or prohibition in aid of its jurisdic-
tion under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), if it would have jurisdiction of an appeal
from a final decision of the lower tribunal. In re Snap-On Tools, 720 F.2d 654, 655 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (writ of mandamus to compel removal); Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agricultural
Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (writ of mandamus to correct abuse of
discretion); Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also C.P.C. v. Nosco Plastics, Inc., 719 F.2d 400, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (All Writs Act
did not apply); In re Makari, 708 F.2d 709, 711 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same); Gould v. Control Laser
Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir.) (stay order not appealable since it was not for a protracted
or indefinite period), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 343 (1983).
Unfortunately, the FCIA makes no provision for interlocutory appeals to the Federal Circuit
from district court orders certifying questions involving patent law. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell
Mfg. Co., 709 F.2d 710 (Fed. Cir. 1983). If the court were permitted to hear these interlocutory
appeals, it could give the district courts guidance in areas of patent law where intercircuit conflicts
exist. See FCIA 1981 Hearings, supra note 157, at 121-22 (statement of Fletcher C. Mann). On
August 4, 1983 legislation was introduced in Congress to authorize the CAFC to hear such inter-
locutory appeals. H.R. 3824, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983), reprinted in PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 649, at 511 (Oct. 6, 1983). The omission of this provision from the
FCIA evidently was a legislative oversight. Cihlar & Goldstein, supra note 143, at 307-08. Also,
the statute does not appear to allow appeals from interlocutory orders (except interlocutory ap-
peals of certified questions) of tribunals, other than federal district courts, that are reviewed by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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The most novel and significant aspect of the court's jurisdiction is appeals
from patent cases in district courts. Numerous commentators have noted that
defining a court's jurisdiction in terms of subject matter can lead to wasteful
litigation over jurisdictional limits, splitting single disputes between two or
more courts, and conflicts with courts of overlapping jurisdiction. 188 In prepar-
ing its proposal, the OIAJ listed the avoidance of jurisdictional disputes as one
of its objectives189 and used a bright line approach to define the patent juris-
diction of the CAFC.1 90 While the legislative history of the FICA191 attempted
to minimize uncertainty over the scope of the new court's jurisdiction, some
jurisdictional problems remain to be resolved.192 The major issues are whether
the well-pleaded complaint rule limits the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit over patent cases, and whether nonpatent claims joined with patent
claims will come within the court's jurisdiction.
2. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
The well-pleaded complaint rule, a requirement of federal question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,193 specifies that a federal question must ap-
pear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and not as an anticipated de-
fense.19' Although criticized for resurrecting outmoded pleading forms,195 the
well-pleaded complaint rule continues to restrict trial court jurisdiction in fed-
eral question cases. 9 An important justification for the rule is that it enables
a trial court to determine its jurisdiction at the outset of the action (from the
complaint) without awaiting further pleadings or speculating as to their con-
tents.197 It also relieves district courts of the burden of trying the many cases
where "[t]he most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in
the background."1 98
The justifications for applying the well-pleaded complaint rule at the trial
188. See FCIA 1981 Hearings, supra note 157, at 133-35 (statement of James W. Geriak);
Addendum, supra note 89, at 92 (statement of John A. Tramontine); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEA-
DOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 170-71; Currie & Goodman, supra note 16, at 73-74;
Jordan, supra note 16, at 748-49.
189. OJAJ Proposal, supra note 127, at D-3.
190. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
191. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 40-43; S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 18-22,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 28-32.
192. Markey, supra note 110, at 231.
193. (Supp. IV 1980).
194. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
195. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 169-72 (1969); IA J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE T 0.160[3.-1] (2d ed. 1983); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts,
53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 176 (1953).
196. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841,
2846-48 (1983).
197. Chisum, supra note 79, at 643; Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a
Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 894 (1967); Mishkin, supra
note 195, at 164, 176.
198. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936).
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court level do not support using it to determine the patent jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit. An appellate court is able to go beyond the complaint and
examine the entire record on appeal to determine its jurisdiction.1 99 Moreover,
whether the CAFC or a regional court of appeals handles appeals from cases
involving patent issues that do not appear on the face of a well-pleaded com-
plaint will not directly affect the workload of federal trial courts.
Nevertheless, it is clear from the language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history that the well-pleaded complaint rule does limit the patent jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The statute grants appel-
late jurisdiction if the district court's jurisdiction was based, in whole or in
part, on section 1338. To supply a bright line test, the FCIA defined the
CAFC's appellate jurisdiction by reference to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.200 The House Report accompanying the FCIA states: "Cases will be
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the
same sense that cases are said to 'arise under' federal law for purposes of
federal question jurisdiction. Contrast, Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New
England Petroleum Corp., . . -2o
Coastal States dealt with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Tem-
porary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) over cases "arising under" 202 the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA) 203 and the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA) °.2  The court in Coastal States found that
three approaches were possible for allocating appeals between the TECA and
the regional courts of appeals. First, cases could be appealed to the TECA if
they arose under the ESA or EPAA in the sense that cases arise under federal
law for federal question jurisdiction (traditional arising under jurisdiction).
Second, cases could be appealed to the TECA if they involved any issue aris-
ing under the ESA or EPAA, whether raised in the complaint or in another
pleading (case jurisdiction). Third, appeals could be bifurcated, so particular
issues that arose under the ESA or EPAA would be appealed to the TECA;
other issues would be appealed to the regional courts of appeal (issue jurisdic-
tion). Referring to previous holdings of the TECA involving its appellate juris-
diction, the Coastal States court opted for the third approach.205
The House Report to the FCIA explicitly rejected this approach and des-
ignated the familiar rules for determining a federal trial court's jurisdiction in
federal question cases to control the patent jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.
Accordingly, the CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from cases that
199. Mishkin, supra note 195, at 164.
200. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
201. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 41.
202. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(b)(2),
85 Stat. 743, 749 (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note at 589 (1982).
203. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743
(1971) (expired 1974), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1982).
204. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1982).
205. Coastal States Mktg. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179, 182-86 (2d Cir.
1979).
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arise under the patent laws if the federal question is substantial 2 6 and appears
on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. 7 Such cases would include patent
infringement actions, 20 8 actions to obtain issuance of patents, 209 actions involv-
ing interfering patents 2 0 or interferences, 212 and declaratory relief actions re-
lating to patent validity.21 2 On the other hand, the regional courts of appeals
would have jurisdiction of appeals from district court cases that do not arise
under the patent laws in the traditional sense, even though they may involve
206. "The statutory language in question specifically requires that the district court have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. This, standing alone, is a substantial requirement. Immate-
rial, inferential, and frivolous allegations of patent questions will not create jurisdiction in the
lower court, and therefore will not create jurisdiction in the appellate court." H.R. REP. No. 312,
supra note 8, at 41; see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 68-72
(1978); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 19, reprinted in
1982 CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 29; cf. O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1, 11-
12 (3d Cir. 1961) (construing requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976) that a patent claim be
"substantial").
207. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841,
2846-48 (1983); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
208. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915); James C. Wilborn & Sons,
Inc. v. Brandex Tilt Sash, Inc., 380 F.2d 44, 47 (7th Cir. 1967).
209. 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West Supp. 1983); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (West
Supp. 1983).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
211. 35 U.S.C.A. § 146 (West Supp. 1983); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (West
Supp. 1983).
212. Federal question jurisdiction extends to declaratory relief actions brought by accused
infringers seeking adjudications of noninfringement or patent invalidity where the existence of an
actual controversy is shown. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Super Prods. Corp. v. D P Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 752-55 (7th Cir. 1977); General Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 326 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1964); Activox, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp., 532
F. Supp. 248, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Some courts have found federal question jurisdiction to be
lacking, though, in declaratory relief actions seeking adjudications of patent invalidity that have
been brought by patent licensees. Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 418, 422 (7th Cir.
1977); Poles, Inc. v. Beecker, 461 F. Supp. 878, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see Thiokol Chem. Corp. v.
Burlington Indus., 448 F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972);
see also Note, Patent Licensee Standing and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
186 (1983) (proposing stricter standing requirements for patent licensees). These courts reason
that no infringement suit may be brought until a patent license agreement has been terminated.
E.g., Thiokol, 448 F.2d at 1331. Other courts have permitted such actions if it is shown that the
licensor is about to terminate the patent license agreement and sue for infringement. Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1977); USM Corp. v. Stan-
dard Pressed Steel Co., 453 F. Supp. 743, 745-46 (N.D. Ill. 1978). In a recent case where a
patent licensee had been sued in state court for breach of a license agreement, the Federal Circuit
held that the totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether a controversy
arising under the patent laws existed and that the licensee could bring an action in federal court to
have the licensed patent declared invalid. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
Courts also have exercised federal question jurisdiction in declaratory relief actions brought
by patentees seeking adjudications of patent infringement, so long as circumstances show the exis-
tence of an actual controversy. Compare Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884, 886
(9th Cir. 1972) (no actual controversy) with Automation Sys. v. Intel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 345,
348 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (actual controversy). Courts have generally not found federal question ju-
risdiction in declaratory relief actions brought by patent licensors. Arvin Indus. v. Berns Air King
Corp., 510 F.2d 1070, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1975); Lansing Research Corp. v. Sybron Corp., 514 F.
Supp. 543, 544-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). But cf. Leesona Corp. v. Concordia Mfg. Co., 312 F. Supp.
392, 397 (D.R.I. 1970) (federal court had no removal jurisdiction over action brought in state
court to determine validity because state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
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patent issues. Such cases would include actions for breach of patent license
agreements,213 actions to obtain title to patents,214 and actions for such torts as
unfair competition, trade libel, or interference with contract or prospective ec-
onomic advantage 21 5 that are brought by or against patentees and in which
issues of patent validity or infringement are in controversy.
A plaintiff in a patent-related case may be able to control, through the
allegations in his complaint, not only where the case is tried, but which court
will hear the appeal. For example, a patentee-licensor has the option of filing
an action in state court (subject to removal to federal court if the parties are
of diverse citizenship) for breach of a license agreement or filing a patent in-
fringement action in federal district court.218 If the parties were of diverse
citizenship, the patentee-licensor's action for breach of the license agreement
could be filed in federal district court and an appeal would go to the regional
court of appeals. But if the patentee-licensor drafted his complaint as an in-
fringement action, the Federal Circuit would decide the appeal. A patentee
with alternative tort and patent infringement remedies would have a similar
ability to select the appellate forum. 217 Nevertheless, a plaintiff who pleads
facts in support of a patent infringement claim should not be able to avoid
appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit merely by alleging
that the trial court's jurisdiction was based on diversity instead of section
1338.211 Like the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts,21 9 the
213. See Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 502 (1926) (action for royalties under
patent license agreements, cancellation of patent license agreements, and reconveyance of patent);
Ausherman v. Stump, 643 F.2d 715, 718 (10th Cir. 1981) (action for reformation or recision of
patent license agreement); Arvin Indus. v. Berns Air King Corp., 510 F.2d 1070, 1072-73 (7th
Cir. 1975) (action for royalties and injunctive relief based on patent license agreement); Lansing
Research Corp. v. Sybron Corp., 514 F. Supp. 543, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (action for royalties
under patent license agreement).
214. See New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 478-79 (1912)
(action to compel assignment); Mead Corp. v. United States, 652 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (declaratory relief action seeking adjudication of ownership); Pendleton v. Ferguson, 15
Cal. 2d 319, 101 P.2d 688 (1940) (action to quiet title).
215. See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(trade libel action against patentee who charged the plaintiff with patent infringement and
threatened suit); Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1969)
(action for interference with contract and prospective economic advantage in which a patent was
involved), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970).
216. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915); Arvin Indus. v. Berns Air
King Corp., 510 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1975).
217. See Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1969)
(plaintiff was allowed to rely on the more liberal venue provisions for diversity of citizenship ac-
tions when it pleaded tort claims and "strained out" all language of patent infringement from its
complaint), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970). But see Cihlar & Goldstein, supra note 143, at 92-
94.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976); see S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 19 ("The committee
is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims of the new Federal Circuit not be
manipulated."), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 29; Cihlar & Goldstein,
supra note 143, at 285-87; Lever, The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (pt. II-
Conclusion), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 243, 253 n.l 12 (1982).
219. Hildebrand v. Honeywell, Inc., 622 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1980); Sikora v. Brenner,
379 F.2d 134, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Beeler v. United States, 338 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.
1964).
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jurisdiction of the CAFC should be based on facts pleaded in the complaint,
rather than on a recitation of particular jurisdictional statutes.
3. Joinder of Nonpatent Claims
The other major issue concerning jurisdiction is the extent to which the
CAFC will decide nonpatent claims that are joined with patent claims. Fre-
quently, patent litigation involves the joinder of patent claims with antitrust,
unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and trade secret misappropriation
claims.220 By authorizing the Federal Circuit to hear appeals where jurisdic-
tion of the district court is based, in whole or in part, on a patent claim, many
problems associated with bifurcated appeals are avoided. The new court gener-
ally will not have to share an appeal from a single case with a regional court
of appeals, and litigants will be spared the task of determining the appropriate
appellate court for individual claims or issues.2 21 If the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court is based in part on a substantial patent claim stated in the com-
plaint, the CAFC may hear the appeal of the entire action, including nonpat-
ent claims that are joined in the complaint with the patent claim and
nonpatent claims that are asserted by defendants as counterclaims, cross-claim
or third-party claims.
The CAFC should have jurisdiction even in some cases where the com-
plaint lacks a substantial patent claim. Although generally determined at the
outset of an action on the basis of the complaint,2 2 federal subject matter
jurisdiction may be sustained on the basis of a counterclaim, 23 cross-claim, 224
or third-party claim 225 having independent subject matter jurisdiction, despite
a jurisdictional defect in the complaint.22 6 A claim with independent subject
matter that is asserted by a defendant may substitute for a defective complaint
for jurisdictional purposes. 22 7 Because a trial court can base federal subject
220. FCIA 1981 Hearings, supra note 157, at 117 (statement of Fletcher C. Mann).
221. For discussions of the difficulties created by the bifurcation of appeals between the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and the regional courts of appeals, see Wiechmann &
Heinzer, An Unappealing Dilemma: Searching for the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals, 3 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 305 (1982); Note, The Appellate Juris-
diction of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 64 MINN. L. REv. 1247, 1255-57 (1980).
222. See notes 193-98 and accompanying text supra.
223. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 539-40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1055 (1981); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615,
617, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980); Wong v. Bacon,
445 F. Supp. 1177, 1183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
224. Picou v. Rimrock Tidelands, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 188, 189 (E.D. La. 1962).
225. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615, 617,
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980); Ferreira v. Sawa-
yama-Kisen KK, 171 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
226. 3 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 13.1511], 13.36, 14.26 (2d ed. 1983); 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1414, 1433 n.42, 1444 (1971
& Supp. 1943). But cf. Somali Dev. Bank v. United States, 508 F.2d 817, 822 (Ct. Cl. 1974)
(after plaintiff's claim was dismissed, Court of Claims lacked independent subject matter jurisdic-
tion over counterclaim asserted by the United States); Mulholland v. United States, 361 F.2d 237,
245 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (same).
227. See Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 362 F. Supp. 864, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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matter jurisdiction on a claim outside the complaint, the Federal Circuit like-
wise should be permitted to base its jurisdiction on patent claims raised only
by a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.2 8
Even though the CAFC has the power to decide appeals involving nonpat-
ent claims that have been joined with patent claims, it may exercise its discre-
tion to transfer appeals of nonpatent claims to the regional courts of appeals.
Just as federal district courts have discretion to decline jurisdiction over pen-
dent and ancillary claims in the interests of "judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to litigants," 221 the Federal Circuit should not assume appellate
jurisdiction over nonpatent claims that do not share common questions of fact
or law with the patent claims with which they have been joined. To avoid
conflicts with the regional courts of appeals on questions of law or fact in a
single case,230 an appeal from a case in which patent and nonpatent claims
have been joined generally should not be bifurcated; the Federal Circuit
should decide the entire case. Where the patent claims are not related to the
nonpatent claims or are not involved in the appeal, however, there is no need
for the CAFC to decide the appeal of the nonpatent claims, and it should
transfer their appeal. 31 By directing appeals of unrelated nonpatent claims to
228. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983); Cihlar & Goldstein, supra note 143, at
287-92. Lever, supra note 218, at 264-65, has argued that the Federal Circuit should not have
appellate jurisdiction over patent claims raised in compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, or third
party claims, but that it should have jurisdiction over patent claims raised in permissive counter-
claims that are severed from the appeal of the rest of the action. The rationale is that the plaintiff
should have control over where the appeal goes and the defendant should not be allowed to manip-
ulate the court's appellate jurisdiction.
229. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Duke v. Reconstruction
Fin. Corp., 209 F.2d 204, 208 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 966 (1954); AMERICAN LAW
INsTIrUTE, supra note 195, at 213 ("If the federal element that is the basis for jurisdiction is
disposed of early in the case, as on the pleadings, it smacks of the tail wagging the dog to continue
with a federal hearing of the state claim.").
230. See Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 490 F.2d 133, 139 (10th Cir. 1973) (problems
when jurisdiction is split between TECA and regional appellate court), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974).
231. See Cihlar & Goldstein, supra note 143, at 299-302; Newman, Tails and Dogs: Patent
and Antitrust Appeals in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 APLA Q.J. 237, 238-
42 (1982). H.R. RaP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 41, notes that critics had expressed concern that
the grant of jurisdiction in § 1295(a)(1) was too broad and suggests that the courts develop
guidelines to deal with appeals of nonpatent claims that have been joined with patent claims. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary echoed these considerations:
The Committee is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims of
the new Federal Circuit not be manipulated. This measure is intended to alleviate the
serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on pat-
ent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of appeals. It is not intended
to create forum shopping opportunities between the Federal Circuit and the regional
courts of appeals on other claims.
Thus, for example, mere joinder of a patent claim in a case whose gravamen is
antitrust should not be permitted to avail a plaintiff of the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit in avoidance of the traditional jurisdiction and governing legal interpretations of
a regional court of appeals. Federal District judges are encouraged to use their author-
ity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rules 13(i), 16, 20(b), 42(b), 54(b),
to ensure the integrity of the jurisdiction of the federal court of appeals by separating
final decisions on claims involving substantial antitrust issues from trivial patent claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, or third party claims raised to manipulate appellate
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the regional courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit can minimize the develop-
ment of precedent in nonpatent areas, such as antitrust law, that may conflict
with precedent in the regional courts of appeals.232
Although the jurisdictional boundaries have not been defined with abso-
lute precision,2 33 few cases are likely to pose difficult problems. Juridictional
disputes should be kept to a minimum, though, since they waste valuable ap-
pellate court time that could more profitably be devoted to the merits of the
appeals. 234 The provision added by the FCIA allowing transfer of an action or
appeal to another court within the federal system to cure a lack of jurisdic-
tion235 will aid in resolving jurisdictional disputes and eliminate the harmful
consequences that formerly resulted when an action or appeal was filed in an
improper court.236 To avoid conflicts with the Federal Circuit and to increase
certainty in the scope of its jurisdiction, regional courts of appeals should gen-
erally defer to its decisions concerning its jurisdiction.23
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been granted exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over most, but not quite all,23 cases involving patent is-
sues. The fact that it does not have jurisdiction over every patent-related ap-
peal should not prevent it from bringing uniformity to patent law, because the
court will decide the bulk of appeals involving patent issues. State appellate
jurisdiction.
The Committee intends for the jurisdictional language to be construed in accor-
dance with the objectives of the Act and these concerns. If, for example, a patent claim
is manipulatively joined to an antitrust action but severed or dismissed before final
decision of the antitrust claim, jurisdiction over the appeal of the antitrust claim should
not be changed by this Act but should rest with the regional court of appeals.
Further, the jurisdictional section of the CAFC should be read with section 301 of
the proposed legislation [28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (West Supp. 1983)]. This latter section
allows any Federal court which lacks jurisdiction over a matter to transfer the com-
plaint or appeal to a proper court, in the same manner as if the complaint or appeal had
been filed in that court in the first instance. This provision, therefore, will allow the
CAFC to transfer cases to the proper circuit court, or vice versa.
S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 19-20, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
29-30.
232. If precedent in antitrust law, for example, developed in the Federal Circuit that dif-
fered from precedent in a particular regional court of appeals, then litigants in that circuit would
be tempted to forum shop between the CAFC and the regional circuits by joining (or not joining)
patent claims with antitrust claims. Uncertainty in antitrust law would result. Federal Circuit
Hearings, supra note 93, at 81-85 (statement of James W. Geriak).
233. The major issues are whether the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is re-
stricted by the well-pleaded complaint rule and under what circumstances it will decide nonpatent
claims that have been joined with patent claims. See notes 193-232 and accompanying text supra.
234. See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
235. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (West Supp. 1983); see notes 284-91 and accompanying text
infra.
236. See S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 30; cf. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 591 F.2d 711 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App.) (appeal lost because it was filed in the wrong court), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879
(1979).
237. See Cihlar & Goldstein, supra note 143, at 299.
238. For example, an action for breach of a license agreement in which a defense of patent
validity is raised may be filed in a state court, over which the Federal Circuit has no appellate
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1976); notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
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courts and the regional courts of appeals that occasionally decide patent issues
can contribute to the goal, so clearly stated in the legislative history of the
FCIA,39 of making patent law uniform throughout the nation by granting
special deference240 to the patent law opinions of the Federal Circuit. 241 Main-
taining this consistency would produce the added benefit of discouraging liti-
gants from directing patent appeals away from the CAFC.
C. The Claims Court
The FCIA created the Claims Court from the trial division of the Court
of Claims. The sixteen commissioners who served on the trial division of the
Court of Claims were designated the first judges on the Claims Court.2 2 Fu-
ture judges on the Claims Court will be appointed to fifteen-year terms by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.243 Under its power to
create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights,2 4 4 Congress established the
Claims Court under article I, rather than article 111.245 Thus, its judges were
not required to be given life tenure and Congress was permitted to provide
means other than impeachment for their removal.246 Although the Claims
Court occupies the National Courts Building in Washington, D.C., it is au-
239. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 20-23; S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 3-6,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 13-16.
240. Decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a predecessor of the Federal
Circuit, generally received the same deference accorded decisions of other courts of appeals; they
were not considered binding by the regional courts of appeals. Stevenson v. Grentec, Inc., 652
F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Gott-
schalk, 484 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
241. Cihlar & Goldstein, supra note 143, at 290; cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940) (unsettled state law questions arising in bankruptcy proceeding should
be submitted to state court).
242. 28 U.S.C.A. § 171 note (West Supp. 1983).
243. Id. §§ 171-172.
244. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70
(1982).
245. 28 U.S.C.A. § 171 (West Supp. 1983). Congress established the Claims Court under
article I instead of article III because the Claims Court was given jurisdiction over congressional
reference cases by 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1492, 2509 (West Supp. 1983), and because its other cases
resembled those of the Tax Court, another article I court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1976). S. REP.
No. 275, supra note 10, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws~at 23. In
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Supreme Court suggested that it was inappro-
priate for an article III court to be given jurisdiction over congressional reference cases, because
they were not cases or controversies within article III's grant of judicial power. Id. at 581-82.
Thereafter, Congress transferred the congressional reference cases from the Court of Claims (de-
clared to be an article III court by 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1976) (repealed 1982)) to the chief commis-
sioner of the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 & notes (1976) (amended 1982); Glosser,
Congressional Reference Cases in the United States Court of Claims: A Historical and Current
Perspective, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 595 (1976). The FCIA transferred congressional reference cases
from the chief commissioner to the chief judge of the Claims Court. See CL. CT. R. App. D.
(procedure in congressional reference cases).
246. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 172, 176 (West Supp. 1983); see also Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553 (1933) (Congress could reduce the annual salary of a judge on the Court of Claims
because the Court of Claims was not considered an article III court).
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thorized to sit anywhere in the United States to minimize expense and incon-
venience for litigants.247
Except in congressional reference cases,248 trials in the Claims Court are
conducted by a single judge.49 In contrast to the trial division of the Court of
Claims, 250 the Claims Court has the power to render final judgments 25 1 subject
to review by the CAFC 52 Trials are conducted according to the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Claims Court Rules, 253 which are based on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2" As recommended by the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary,255 the Claims Court has begun to publish its decisions.
The jurisdiction of the Claims Court extends only to claims against the
United States256 and is nearly coextensive with its predecessor's. The Claims
Court can decide claims based on express or implied contracts with the United
States, claims for the return of money paid to the United States, and claims
where a specific federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law grants a
right to payment expressly or by implication. 257 The jurisdiction of the Claims
Court is concurrent with the district courts for claims against the United
States (other than claims under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978) that do
not exceed $10,000, and claims for tax refunds. Its jurisdiction is exclusive for
claims in excess of $10,000.215 The Claims Court has no jurisdiction over tort
claims against the United States;259 they must be filed in federal district court
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.260 Formerly, the Court of Claims had
jurisdiction of appeals from federal district courts of tort claims against the
United States, provided that all parties consented. 1 Since only one such ap-
peal was ever filed, the Claims Court was not given this unused jurisdiction.262
247. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 173, 2505 (West Supp. 1983). A major benefit that the trial divi-
sion of the Court of Claims offered to litigants was that a trial judge could receive portions of the
evidence in a case at different times and in different locations. Marvel, Forum Selection in Fed-
eral Tax Litigation, LITIGATION, Summer 1982, at 39, 41-42; see Ct. Cl. R. 132 (1976); Federal
Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 44 (statement of Hon. Daniel M. Friedman, Chief Judge,
Court of Claims); FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10, at 637 (statement of Hon. Edward S.
Smith, Associate Judge, Court of Claims) ("It has been said, perhaps with some exaggeration,
that the trial judges of the Court of Claims will try your case in your living room.").
248. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2509 (West Supp. 1983); CL. CT. R. APP. D.
249. 28 U.S.C.A. § 174 (West Supp. 1983).
250. See notes 151-57 and accompanying text supra.
251. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1491, 1495-1497, 1499, 1503, 2503 (West Supp. 1983).
252. Id. § 1295(a)(3).
253. Id. § 2503.
254. CL. CT. R. note.
255. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 8, at 32.
256. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589 (1941); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (West
Supp. 1983).
257. Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007-13 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see
United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961, 2967-69 n.16 (1983).
258. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1491 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983).
259. Transcountry Packing Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 1333 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976) (repealed 1982).




The Claims Court hears a variety of cases involving claims against the
United States. These include tax cases, government contract cases, military
and civilian pay cases, suits for just compensation, Indian claims, and patent
infringement actions against the United States.263 For the past several years,
about one-third of the docket of the Court of Claims consisted of tax cases, the
largest single category of cases heard by the court.'" The fact that taxpayers
could avoid adverse precedent from the court of appeals for their home circuit
by filing in the Court of Claims probably accounted for this large number.265
Unlike the taxpayer's local federal district court or the Tax Court, the alterna-
tive forums for litigating tax cases, the Court of Claims was not bound by
decisions of the court of appeals for the taxpayer's circuit.266
The relief available in the Claims Court is limited. For many years, the
court could award only money judgments. While it could use equitable proce-
dures or substantive law to arrive at a monetary judgment, 2 7 the court could
not award injunctive 268 or declaratory relief.269 In 1972, Congress granted the
Court of Claims the power to restore wrongfully dismissed government em-
ployees to their former positions, so that they would not have to bring duplica-
tive litigation in the Court of Claims for back pay and suits in federal district
court for job restoration.270 The Tax Reform Act of 1976271 granted the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments with respect to the ex-
empt status of organizations under I.R.C. § 7428.272 The FCIA enlarged the
remedial powers of the Claims Court slightly beyond those given to the Court
of Claims by authorizing it to grant declaratory and equitable relief on gov-
ernment contract claims in actions filed in the Claims Court before the award-
ing of a government contract. 27 ' After a government contract is awarded, a
263. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1491-1507 (West Supp. 1983).
264. Federal Circuit Hearings, supra note 93, at 18-20, 33 (statement of Hon. Daniel M.
Friedman, Chief Judge, Court of Claims); ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 410.
265. See Jones & Singer, Changes in Procedure, Strategy Due in New Federal Circuit and
Revamped Claims Court, 57 J. TAX'N 136, 136 (1982); Marvel, supra note 247, at 40-41.
266. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controver-
sies, 48 IOWA L. REV. 312, 346-47 (1963); Miller, Tax Litigation in the Court of Claims, 55
GEo. L.J. 454, 456-57 (1966).
267. See, e.g., Pauley Petroleum v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308, 1314-17 (Ct. CI.) (reci-
sion of lease), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979); Higgs v. United States, 546 F.2d 373, 376 (Ct.
Cl. 1976) (contract reformation); Quinault Allottee Ass'n v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1274-
75 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (class action).
268. Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464 (1973); United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889).
269. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
270. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) (amended 1982). For a discussion of the Court of Claims'
authority to award equitable relief in back-pay cases, see Comment, Equitable Relief in the
United States Court of Claims Under Public Law 92-415, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 465 (1973).
271. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1717-18 (1976).
272. (West Supp. 1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1507 (1976) (amended 1982); see also United
States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961, 2968 & n.15 (1983) (limited authority of Court of Claims to
award declaratory relief).
273. CACI, Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1572-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983); United
States v. John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also F. Alderete Gen.
Contractors v. United States, 715 F.2d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (if the Claims Court acquires juris-
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disappointed bidder can seek monetary relief in the Claims Court;274 but he
must bring an action in a federal district court under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act21 5 to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief.2 6
D. Miscellaneous Provisions
The FCIA adopted a number of reforms that are effective throughout the
federal system. These changes deal with administration, transfers to cure lack
of jurisdiction, interest rates for judgments, and the use of electronic court
reporting methods.
To promote stability in the office of chief judge in a court of appeals or a
district court, chief judges now are selected for seven-year terms or until they
reach the age of seventy. The chief judge is the judge in regular active service
with the most seniority who is less than sixty-five years of age, who has served
on the court for at least one year, and who has not served as chief judge
previously.27 7 The FCIA also amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 45-46278 to require a pre-
siding judge of a three-judge panel of a court of appeals to be a regular active
judge from that court, and to require at least two of the three judges sitting on
a panel to be judges of that court.21 9 These changes were designed to enhance
stability in the law of the circuit.280 The FCIA also made senior judges eligible
to participate on en banc courts reviewing decisions of panels on which they
diction to grant declaratory and equitable relief, subsequent award of the contract will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction). Compare Opal Mfg. Co. v. UMC Indus., 553 F. Supp. 131, 133
(D.D.C. 1982) (jurisdiction of the Claims Court to award equitable relief in pre-award govern-
ment contracts cases is exclusive of the federal district courts) with H.R. REp. No. 312, supra
note 8, at 43 (augmented power of Claims Court to grant declaratory judgements and give equita-
ble relief in contract actions prior to award "is exclusive of the Board of Contract Appeals and not
to the exclusion of the district courts").
One version of the FCIA would have given the Claims Court power to award declaratory and
equitable relief in all cases. This broad grant was substantially narrowed in the final version.
United States v. John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Similarly, in 1972
Congress considered giving the Court of Claims broad powers to grant declaratory and equitable
relief before deciding to limit its equitable power to reinstating wrongfully dismissed government
employees. Comment, supra note 270, at 469-73.
274. United States v. John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362, 1377 n.23 (Fed Cir. 1983)
(dictum); see Keco Indus. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
275. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
276. B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 725-28 (2d Cir. 1983); Ameri-
can Dist. Tel. v. Department of Energy, 555 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-48 (D.D.C. 1983); H.R. REP.
No. 312, supra note 8, at 43-44; see Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
277. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 45, 136 (West Supp. 1983); S. RaP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 8-9,
25-26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 18-19, 35-36. This modification of
the procedure for selecting chief judges was proposed in the Hruska Report, supra note 11, at
274.
278. (1976).
279. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 45-46 (West Supp. 1983).
280. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 9, 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 19, 36. The Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 275, proposed that presiding judges of
panels should be selected from the regular active judges on the court of appeals.
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sat2 l and authorized the hiring of central staff attorneys by courts of ap-
peals. 82 Finally, the courts of appeals must now publish their rules of practice
and internal operating procedures and appoint advisory committees to study
the rules and procedures.283
The FCIA added 28 U.S.C.A. § 16311" to authorize federal courts to
transfer civil actions or appeals to cure lack of jurisdiction. Upon determining
that it lacks jurisdiction over a civil action or appeal, any federal court may, in
the interest of justice, transfer the action or appeal to a court where the action
or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed. The action or
appeal will then proceed as if it had been originally filed in the second fo-
rum.185 Section 1631 is similar to former 28 U.S.C. § 1506,86 which permit-
ted transfers from the Court of Claims to the federal district courts to cure
lack of jurisdiction,287 and 28 U.S.C. § 1406,288 which permits transfers be-
tween federal districts courts to cure improper venue.28 9 Based on a recom-
mendation of Judge Leventhal, 90 section 1631 protects a litigant who files an
action or appeal in an improper court from the harsh sanction of dismissal. It
also eliminates the need for a litigant to file in more than one court if he is
uncertain about venue.291
Another reform of the FCIA was the setting of a uniform national rate of
interest on federal court judgments. Previously, district court judgments ac-
crued interest at rates allowed under state law.2 92 Judgments (except in tax
refund cases) now accrue interest at rates paid by the federal government on
one-year United States Treasury bills.293 In tax refund cases, rates are based
on an average prime rate charged by banks, determined semi-annually by the
Secretary of the Treasury.2  Interest is not allowed on Claims Court judg-
ments except in tax refund cases and in cases where a Claims Court judgment
against the United States has been affirmed after review by the Supreme
281. 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (West Supp. 1983).
282. Id. § 715. The Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 260-62, recommended the use of
central staff attorneys in the courts of appeals.
283. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2077 (West Supp. 1983). This had also been proposed in the Hruska
Report, supra note 11, at 250-53.
284. (West Supp. 1983).
285. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (West Supp. 1983).
286. (1976) (repealed 1982).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976) (repealed 1982).
288. (1976) (amended 1982).
289. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); see Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369
U.S. 463 (1962) (transfer permitted under § 1406(a)).
290. Opinions Seeking Rule Changes Invited, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1982, at 4; see Invest-
ment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring); Judicial Housekeeping: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 372-90
(1977) (app. 5d).
291. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 10, at 11, 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 21, 40.
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) (amended 1982).
293. 28 U.S.C.A. §1961(a) (West Supp. 1983).




The FCIA also authorized the use of electronic court-reporting methods
in the federal district courts, subject to regulation by the Judicial Conference,
as an alternative to the shorthand or mechanical means that formerly were the
only methods allowed.296 To provide a period for experimenting with the new
methods, court proceedings continued to be required to be recorded by short-
hand or mechanical means until October 1, 1983.297 The electronic court-re-
porting experiment was a success. 29 Since January 1, 1984, federal district
court judges have been permitted to use electronic reporting in lieu of short-
hand or mechanical methods. 99
VI. FUTURE REFORMS
The FCIA merits attention not only because of the changes it has made
in the federal court system but because of the influence it may have on further
reforms. The rising volume of federal litigation over the past two decades has
generated increasing pressure for reform at the federal appellate level. Reform
efforts have been directed primarily to two related problems: the excessive
caseload of the Supreme Court and the lack of appellate capacity sufficient to
settle questions of national law. Chief Justice Burger devoted his 1983 Annual
Report on the State of the Judiciary to the Supreme Court's caseload, which
he characterized as "perhaps the most important single, immediate problem
facing the judiciary."300 Other observers have focused on the lack of sufficient
appellate capacity in the federal system.301
Many proposals have been advanced to deal with these problems. Judge
Friendly30 2 would reduce the federal court caseload by removing several cate-
gories of cases (most notably diversity cases) from the federal system and di-
recting them to the state courts.303 Abolishing the Supreme Court's mandatory
appellate jurisdiction has also been proposed. 3 4 Some commentators view the
295. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961, 2516(b) (West Supp. 1983); 127 CONG. REC. S14699-701
(daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981).
296. 28 U.S.C.A. § 753(b) (West Supp. 1983).
297. Id. § 753 note; 128 CONG. REC. H747 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1982); 127 CONG. REc.
S14694, S14701-02 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981).
298. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF STENOGRAPHIC AND
AUDIOTAPE METHODS FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT REPORTING 77-81 (1983).
299. Judicial Conference Regulation (September 22, 1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2186
(Oct. 4, 1983).
300. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 442 (1983).
301. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 213-14; Griswold, supra note 11, at 339; Haworth
& Meador, supra note 11, at 201-08; Hufstedler, supra note 9.
302. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974).
303. FCIA 1979 Hearings, supra note 10, at 163-90 (1979) (statement of Hon. Henry J.
Friendly, Judge, Second Circuit); H. FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 129-52, 197-99; Friendly, supra
note 302, at 640-46; see also H.R. 3690-3693, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 6691, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (bills to limit diversity jurisdiction).
304. Freund Report, supra note 26, at 595-605; G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at
98, 117; H. FRIENDLY, supra note 7, at 50; Simpson, Turning Over the Reins: The Abolition of
the Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297 (1978); see
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Court's excessive caseload as partially self-inflicted and urge greater restraint
in selecting cases for review.305 Judge Schaefer would deal with intercircuit
conflicts by adopting a court rule that would make the decision of a panel of a
court of appeals controlling precedent nationwide until it was overruled by a
court of appeals en banc.es
Proposals adding a fourth appellate layer to the federal system have
sparked the greatest controversy. The Freund Committee suggested a National
Court of Appeals staffed by seven circuit judges on temporary assignment that
would screen cases for the Supreme Court, while retaining some cases for de-
cision on the merits.307 The Hruska Commission recommended a National
Court of Appeals, with seven permanently assigned judges to decide cases re-
ferred by the Supreme Court or transferred to it by the circuit courts of ap-
peals.308 Chief Justice Burger has advocated a temporary panel of circuit
judges to resolve intercircuit conflicts.309 Numerous variations of these propos-
als have been advanced.3 10
An alternative response is to centralize appeals in particular subject areas
in specified courts. Nonuniformity in national law is a consequence of the
nineteenth century Evarts Act's division of the intermediate appellate system
along geographical lines. Centralization of tax appeals has been advocated for
many years to produce greater certainty and uniformity in tax law.311 Some
H.R. 1968, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 385, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S894
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983); S. 1531, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
305. Griswold, Helping the Supreme Court by Reducing the Flow of Cases into the Courts
of Appeals. 67 JUDICATURE 58, 60-65 (1983); Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An
Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 787, 796-803 (1983); Kurland
& Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982. 50 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 628, 644-
51 (1983); Rosenfield, The Supreme Court in Crisis: A Proposed Solution, 30 FED. B. NEws &
J. 343 (1983); Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177 (1982); see G.
CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 56-57.
306. Schaefer, supra note 1.
307. Freund Report, supra note 26, at 590-95.
308. Hruska Report, supra note 11, at 236-47.
309. Burger, supra note 300, at 447; Chief Justice Seeks Creation of National En Banc
Panel, THRD BRANCH, June 1983, at 1; see H.R. 1970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Intercircuit
Tribunal of the United States Courts of Appeals with reference jurisdiction); S. 645, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 601-607, 129 CONG. REc. S1948, S1955-56 (daily ed. March 1, 1983) (Intercircuit
Tribunal of the United States Courts of Appeals with reference jurisdiction).
310. See S. 382, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (National Court of Appeals with reference
jurisdiction consisting of a Chancellor and a pool of circuit judges); S. 2035, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), 128 CONG. REC. S223 (daily ed. Jan 29, 1982); S. 1529, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG. REC. 58750 (daily ed. July 29, 1981) (National Court of Appeals with reference jurisdic-
tion consisting of nine judges). Other proposals are discussed in P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR &
M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 208-24; Levin, Adding Appellate Capacity to the Federal Sys-
tem: A National Court of Appeals or an Inter-Circuit Tribunal?, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1
(1982); Meador, supra note 48, at 625-33, 641-47; Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercir-
cuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 934-40
(1983); Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the
Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REv. 307 (1983).
311. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 217; H.
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L. REV. 1153 (1944); Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 (1975).
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persons have seen a need for a special environmental court,312 and a court to
review administrative actions has been considered from time to time.3 13 Re-
cently, Justice Cameron from Arizona has championed a National Court of
State Appeals that would decide all appeals from state courts involving federal
questions. 314
While appellate courts with topical subject matter jurisdiction offer sig-
nificant benefits to the federal system, they pose potential disadvantages that
have been noted by the Hruska Commission and others. One disadvantage is
the difficulty of defining their jurisdiction precisely. Great attention must be
paid to drawing clear boundaries to minimize wasteful litigation over jurisdic-
tion. Other disadvantages may follow from the specialized nature of the
courts. Judges might not maintain a generalist perspective or might be influ-
enced by special interest groups, and specialized courts might not attract
judges of the highest quality.
The disadvantages relating to specialization may be avoided in several
ways. The FCIA attempted to deal with specialization by giving the CAFC
jurisdiction over a variety of areas of federal law and requiring rotation of
judges. A judge does not have to sit on a court of general jurisdiction to have a
generalist perspective; federal judges are generalists even though they sit on
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Likewise, it is not necessary for
appellate judges to hear every type of case that can be tried in a federal dis-
trict court to avoid the dangers of specialization. Whether the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit has a sufficiently generalized jurisdiction remains
to be seen; if it does not, its jurisdiction can be enlarged.
A second means to minimize the disadvantages of specialization is to staff
courts having topical subject matter jurisdiction with circuit judges assigned
on a temporary or part-time basis. 31 5 Examples of such courts are the TECA,
the Multidistrict Litigation Panel,316 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review, and the Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973.327 An early version of the FCIA contemplated a Court of Tax Appeals
made up of twelve circuit judges assigned to it for three-year terms. 18 No
312. Haworth & Meador, supra note 11, at 211-12; Whitney, The Case for Creating a
Special Environmental Court System-A Further Comment, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33
(1973); Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 M. &
MARY L. REV. 473 (1973).
313. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 220-21; Car-
rington, supra note 7, at 608; Currie & Goodman, supra note 16, at 82-85; Jordan, supra note 16,
at 765-67; Marquardt & Wheat, The Developing Concept of an Administrative Court, 33 AD. L.
REV. 301 (1981); Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REV. 996 (1971).
314. Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions and a Proposal for a
National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
RaV. 545, 558-75; see also Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions:
The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 965 & n.75 (1976).
315. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 169-70; Car-
rington, supra note 7, at 611.
316. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1976).
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matter how narrow the subject matter, overspecialization would be avoided
because judges would continue to perform their generalist duties on the circuit
courts to which they were permanently attached. The major advantage of
these courts is flexibility. Circuit judges could be rotated for various terms and
the courts could be discontinued when no longer needed. On the other hand,
highly qualified judges might not wish to serve on part-time courts, and the
transitory nature of such courts would not enhance doctrinal stability.
A third alternative would be to direct appeals relating to specified subject
matters to particular circuit courts of appeals. 319 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia currently has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from a
number of administrative agencies.3 20 By giving other circuit courts exclusive
jurisdiction over clearly specified categories of appeals, the advantages of hav-
ing these appeals decided by a single court could be achieved without sacrific-
ing a significant loss of generalist perspective. The feasibility of this alternative
is limited by the workload of the circuit court which would receive exclusive
jurisdiction over the appeals and the willingness of the other circuits to give up
that jurisdiction. Of course, if carried to an extreme, this alternative could
lead to undesirable specialization of all the circuits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The debate over reform of the federal appellate system has been going on
for many years and has increased in intensity over the past decade. Our fed-
eral system has been severely strained by a steadily rising caseload. Grave
concern has been directed to two problems: the excessive burden on the Su-
preme Court and the lack of sufficient appellate capacity to resolve questions
of national law in a reasonable time. Many see an urgent need for fundamen-
tal change in the federal appellate system and advocate major reforms. Others
contend that the problems are not serious enough to warrant these changes. 321
Whether the future will see more appellate courts of topical subject matter
jurisdiction will depend in part on how the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is viewed by the public at large and the litigants who appear before
it.322 May it have every success in achieving its "goal of deciding. . . appeals
before they're filed. '3 23
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